Co-Producing National Belonging and Security – South Asian Voices

The Shree Mata Vaishno Devi Institute of Medical Excellence (SMVDIME), a government-run Medical College in Jammu, recently became the subject of national controversy after admitting its inaugural class of medical students. Managed by the statutory, non-religious body Shree Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board (SMVDSB), the Institute is legally open to students of all religions, castes, and communities residing in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). That 42 of the admitted students in a class of 50 were Muslim was perfectly legal, with admission offered only on the basis of the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test merit among J&K domiciles. However, the Shree Mata Vaishno Devi Sangharsh Samiti (Samiti), which comprises nearly 60 pro-Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and pro-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) organizations, mobilized against the admissions. The Samiti demanded the prioritization of Hindu students, arguing that the College is funded by Shrine donations, and eventually, that the college should be shut entirely. In January 2026, the National Medical Council (NMC) revoked the college’s recognition for non-compliance with its standards, highlighting issues such as poor infrastructure, inadequate clinical resources, a shortage of qualified full-time teaching staff, and a limited number of resident doctors—despite having been cleared by regulators on all of these accounts in September 2025.

While the revocation of SMVDIME’s credentials is allegedly procedurally unrelated, that the controversy was catalyzed by groups including the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the BJP reveals the growing power of communalizing forces to influence and bend institutional and constitutional principles along the lines of identity, as these groups themselves note. Episodes like this are especially noteworthy for long-term national security, especially in the socio-political context of Kashmir, where national belonging is already contested, and for India, where national security is historically and structurally fraught: shaped by the unresolved legacy of Pakistan, inter-regional rivalry with Pakistan and China, and persistent internal and civil conflicts that blur the boundary between external and internal security. Such issues showcase how, through sustained communalizing pressures, institutional and organizational spaces can be converted into sites of identity assertion that can weaken social trust, the very bedrock of national security.

The Exception or the Rule?

The SMVDIME incident is part of a broader, troubling pattern in the history of the partitioned Indian subcontinent, wherein communalism—the idea of Hindu-Muslim being two separate nations—is not some organic religious division, but rather is shaped by colonial rule, elite political tactics, and the strategic reorganization of identities in modern mass politics. The rise of Narendra Modi in 2014 significantly accelerated this trend, leading to a reinterpretation of national identity centered on Hinduism and Hindi. This shift has manifested through both government policies and wider societal changes: Institutions and political figures increasingly endorse pro-Hindu viewpoints, public discussions show a greater acceptance of majoritarian rhetoric, and subnational actions—like cow protection campaigns, rewriting historical narratives, and moral policing—have disproportionately targeted Muslims and other minorities. This creates a sense of non-belongingness or second-class belongingness for a majority of Muslim, Christian, and other minority populations. Consequently, this reflects more than just electoral gains for a party; it also reveals the changing nature of how belonging is politically recreated in India.

One of the many examples of this is the increasing normalization of “bulldozer justice” as extra-legal punishment that disproportionately targets Muslim homes, businesses, and places. Framed as “decisive governance,” such actions function as collective punishment and convey a debilitating message to Indian Muslims that their citizenship and belonging are conditional and can be disciplined through dispossession or revocation.

Notably, right-wing backlash has threatened writers, artists, and other celebrities, exemplified by communal targeting of prominent Muslim or Hindu figures with a visible secular-liberal outlook working within clear institutional norms. Most recently, the controversy surrounding the release of Bangladeshi Mustafizur Rahman from his contract with the Kolkata Knight Riders (KKR)—which spiraled into an India-Bangladesh diplomatic dispute that threatened to throw the T20 Cricket World Cup into disarray—highlights two key points. First, it reveals the close connection between (Indian) state power and the international cricket administration, which is commonly viewed as being increasingly governed by a single (Hindutva) political ideology. It also further spotlighted the continued targeting of Muslim public figures and celebrities who, because of their religion or their popular image, are seen as critics of the ruling party—in this case, not just Rahman, but also KKR owner and superstar actor Shah Rukh Khan, who has been the target of such selective backlash for years.

These incidents may seem disconnected, but they illustrate the broader communal forces seeking to override procedural legality at the individual, institutional, and collective levels. In India, they signify a profound redefinition of Indian nationalism, emphasizing the cultural dominance of the Hindu majority over the previously dominant secular, pluralist concept of the state. It shows how institutions are forced to yield to ideological pressure and signals to the Indian people that state protection is unequal and conditional.

Foreclosing Shared Futures and Security

The consequences of such repeated communalizing mobilizations are especially destabilizing in J&K. Most recently, after the deadly Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025, where most of the victims were Hindu tourists, the security situation has once again become dire. First, there was a temporary spike in tensions along the Line of Control with Operation Sindoor and Operation Mahadev, which India carried out against Pakistan and against terrorists near Srinagar, respectively. Secondly, according to government sources, there were continued infiltration attempts and militant activity. Lastly, and most strikingly, there were intensified Indian counter-terror operations aimed at preventing a broader resurgence of militancy. India’s response involved extensive security actions—mass arrests, communication blackouts, demolitions, and deportations—indicating a move toward broad, securitized governance where counter-terrorism measures may override civil liberties and due process.

Following Pahalgam, the security issue was once again transformed along religious lines, where conflict was communalized through political mobilization, rumors, and narratives of communal threat, which could polarize communities and set the groundwork for potential communal violence. However, in J&K, as elsewhere in India, one is neither just Muslim nor Hindu, but instead a multitude of identities shaped by intersecting regional, ethnic, caste, linguistic, sectarian, class, historical, and aspirational lines that defy any binary. Yet political mobilizations that claim to speak for religious communities flatten these complexities and reduce them to objects of communal narration, political mobilization, or administrative management. More gravely, such practices harden identities, entrench antagonism, and turn difference into permanent conflict.

Crucially, this communalization of national belonging creates a deeper crisis for stable peace and security in India. Stable positive peace and long-term security in a highly diverse nation like India can only be created and sustained when they are treated as a shared social condition. But the increasing communalization of everyday belonging through majoritarian and religious or identity claims frames peace and security as a zero-sum project built on exclusion. This forecloses shared futures and erodes trust between citizens and the state. As a result, institutions such as SMVDIME become battlegrounds for identity assertion, and J&K becomes a site of constant security contestation. This is particularly concerning for India, already grappling with protracted conflict and political volatility in Kashmir, as it cannot ensure long-term stability with coercion or surveillance alone. 

Co-Producing Peace

The prolonged communalization of Kashmiri people forecloses a shared future and cannot be dealt with through episodic crisis management. India must reimagine peace and security through a long-term relational approach. This is where co-production of peace becomes significant. The “co-production of peace” refers to sustained, long-term processes at the institutional and informal levels that involve local communities, institutions, and the state working together to build peace through dialogue, negotiations, and mutual recognition. Especially in a region like J&K, which is marked by historical trauma, overlapping exclusions, and competing narratives of victimhood, managing periodic communalizing crises by homogenizing identity into religious binaries is neither sufficient nor effective.

India needs to develop institutionalized forums for sustained dialogue, governance grounded in sustained engagement, and practices of everyday reconciliation that involve various state institutions, security agencies, district administrations, educational institutions, civil society, and local communities. Communities of Practice, such as Sulah-Vārta, can serve as collaborative platforms for peacebuilding actors to share knowledge and coordinate efforts, to surface grievances early, prevent them from being captured by communalizing forces, and to incrementally rebuild trust.

However, the challenges to such an approach are significant. Since the reading down and abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A, respectively, in August 2019, the central government has increasingly governed J&K through a security and administrative lens, rather than through participatory political engagement. Although the District Development Council Elections in December 2020 and the Legislative Elections in 2024 did show the minimum level of participatory democracy from New Delhi, the management of broader administration and local and regional security remains with New Delhi through the Lieutenant Governor. The emphasis remains on restoring order, managing dissent, and containing potential political unrest through surveillance, coercion, and administrative control. While these measures may address short-term issues, in the long term, they do not contribute to security and peace.

Trust is equally crucial. Years of conflict, displacement, and disputed narratives of belonging have fostered a significant emotional and political divide between numerous communities in Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian government. For initiatives aimed at fostering dialogue, they would also need to address this trust deficit by signaling accountability, transparency, and inclusion.

Notwithstanding these challenges, co-producing peace provides a strong framework to rethink security and peace by strengthening the state’s authority by rooting governance in legitimacy rather than coercion. It allows institutions to be seen as shared civic spaces rather than contested symbols. With sustained political commitment, formal support, transparency, and continuity, such initiatives could help bridge the persistent gap between citizens and the state.

Conclusion

For India, it is important to co-produce belonging such that citizens see their futures as shared. Co-production of peace offers a way to rethink security in terms of social legitimacy, national belonging in plurality, and political authority through engagement rather than coercion. This allows for peace and stability to be grounded in practices of listening, negotiation, and mutual recognition, rather than a temporary absence of violence.

However, this begs the question: to what extent is the Indian government willing to build a secular vision of affective citizenship? In recent years, there has been a tilt towards a majoritarian interpretation of citizenship and national belonging, with the Citizenship Amendment Act, which creates a pathway to citizenship for non-Muslim refugees of regional countries, being the primary example. But the cost of continuing such a trajectory of communalized politics is high: the weakening of institutions and the deep alienation of populations across India and in ethnic core regions like Kashmir, which ultimately undermine the very security of the nation.  

Without deep, overarching thinking about national belonging and security, controversies such as SMVDIME will continue to recur. Each incident could deepen division, harden identities, and push peace and stability even further out of reach.

Views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.

Also Read: The Shadow of Bangladesh: Elections and Paradiplomacy in Assam

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Image 1: Vinayaraj via Wikimedia Commons

Image 2: Varun Bajaj via Wikimedia Commons