2nd stage enables live Chromium browser control
A second stage of the attack, triggered by a “remote_stream” command from the attacker’s command-and-control (C2) panel, returns a module that enables live remote-control of the victim’s Chromium browsers via the Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP). This module works with a subset of seven browsers — Chrome, Brave, Edge, Arc, Opera, Vivaldi and Chromium itself — and spawns a headless version of the browser that can be fully controlled by the attacker.The module clones the victim’s browser profile before launching the headless browser, allowing the attacker to control the browser through the victim’s logged-in profile. Two WebSockets form a relay channel to send operator commands to the browser and a 3 FPS screencast back to the attacker, with the attacker able to interact in real time via full keyboard and mouse inputs.The module also steals browser cookies by calling Network.getAllCookies via CDP, writing the results to a Netscape cookie file that can then be imported to the attacker’s own browser. It also opens the Cookies database directly via SQLite and attempts to re-encrypt the cookies with the Safe Storage master key written in Stage 1, although the researchers noted that attempting to recreate this step in their lab environment failed on macOS 26.The login page for the attacker’s C2 panel, titled “Amnesia Panel,” was found at the same domain that AmnesiaStealer and the remote control module were retrieved from; a failed login returns a Russian-language error message, the researchers observed.While AmnesiaStealer shares similarities to other macOS stealers such as Atomic Stealer (AMOS), MacSync and CrashStealer and is spread through similar methods, its OS-version awareness and use of a live browser control module make it stand out, the researchers said.“A working collector paired with a working browser-hijack stage, wrapped around a few dated bypasses, makes it worth tracking,” the researchers concluded.
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