Insider Brief
- The Netherlands’ new quantum strategy targets technological leadership by 2035 through commercial development, reduced foreign dependencies and protection against quantum-related security threats.
- Building on 614.9 million euros previously allocated to Quantum Delta NL, the government plans to support research, financing and early procurement, with further ambitions subject to available budgets.
- The strategy calls for completing post-quantum cryptography migration for high-risk government uses by 2030 and medium-risk uses by 2035.
- Photo by engin akyurt on Unsplash
The Netherlands plans to turn its quantum research strengths into commercial products while preparing government systems for computers that could defeat widely used encryption.
A new governmentwide quantum strategy sets a 2035 goal for technological leadership, greater independence from suppliers outside the European Union and resilience against quantum-related security threats. It combines support for research, investment and public procurement with a timetable for replacing vulnerable cryptography.
The government said Economic Affairs and Climate Minister Heleen Herbert and Willemijn Aerdts, state secretary for digital economy and sovereignty, submitted the Cabinet-approved strategy to the House of Representatives. It was developed with ministries responsible for defense, foreign affairs, finance, infrastructure, justice, education, health and other government functions.
The plan builds on 614.9 million euros previously made available to Quantum Delta NL through the National Growth Fund, according to the government statement. That funding supports the development of the Dutch quantum sector.
The strategy does not establish a new, fully funded spending program for all its ambitions. Its actions are already underway or are to be accommodated within existing departmental resources. Further assessments could identify a need for additional funding, but the document says ambitions will be adjusted if sufficient resources cannot be found.
Turning Research Into Sales
The government identifies quantum technology as a potential source of better medicines, batteries and navigation systems, with applications across energy, health care, logistics and defense.
The strategy covers three fields, including quantum computing, quantum communication and quantum sensing. Quantum computing uses the behavior of particles to tackle certain calculations that are difficult for conventional computers. Quantum communication transfers information using quantum states. Quantum sensing uses the sensitivity of quantum systems to measure changes in gravity, magnetic fields and other physical conditions.
The document indicates that, of the three, quantum sensing is more developed and some commercial applications are already in use. Many proposed computing applications still require more capable and reliable machines.
According to the strategy, the Netherlands has dozens of active quantum startups employing more than 700 people. It identifies Delft as Europe’s largest quantum cluster, with nearly 600 jobs and 350 million euros in private capital attracted.
The challenge is converting that research and business base into sustained economic returns. The strategy identifies the absence of developed markets for many quantum applications as a major obstacle to commercialization.
The government plans to explore a larger role as an early customer, commissioning partner and user. Public purchases could help companies test products, establish demand and attract private investment, particularly in areas where government agencies are major customers, such as defense, secure communications and infrastructure.
One possibility is purchasing a quantum computer for research, consistent with the coalition’s ambition to build a quantum computer in the Netherlands. The strategy presents this as an option to assess, rather than an awarded contract.
The planned National Agency for Disruptive Innovation, known as NADI, could also support quantum development. Its design draws inspiration from Germany’s SPRIN-D and Britain’s ARIA, which back ambitious technologies with uncertain outcomes. The Dutch government wants quantum companies and researchers connected to the agency’s development.
Other measures include supporting research facilities, improving access to private and European financing, reducing regulatory burdens and making better commercial use of intellectual property.
Cyber-Protection Timetable
The most immediate security concern is the prospect that sufficiently powerful quantum computers could break widely used public-key cryptography, which helps protect information, verify identities and authenticate software.
The strategy uses a possible 2029-to-2035 window for the arrival of such a computer while explicitly acknowledging that the timing remains uncertain. It says Dutch intelligence and digital infrastructure authorities advise organizations to prepare for the possibility of a machine capable of doing so around 2030.
The risk begins before that capability arrives. Attackers can collect encrypted information today and retain it for later decryption, potentially exposing material that must remain confidential for years.
The government’s principal response is post-quantum cryptography, mathematical methods designed to resist attacks from both conventional and quantum computers. These methods operate on conventional hardware, but replacing existing cryptography requires changes across systems, suppliers and organizational processes.
The strategy cites a Dutch migration handbook indicating that the transition for a central government organization can take at least eight years.
Its timetable calls for government organizations to incorporate quantum risks into risk management and establish their own cryptography policies by the end of 2026. By the end of 2027, they should have at least draft migration plans, prepare or conduct trials, and account for the people and resources required.
By the end of 2030, migration should be complete for high-risk uses. Medium-risk uses should follow by the end of 2035, with low-risk uses completed as far as possible. The government may accelerate or adjust the schedule as threats change.
The document also covers the difference between post-quantum cryptography from quantum key distribution, which uses quantum communication to exchange encryption keys. It suggests the central government is not currently using quantum key distribution for information security, citing implementation concerns and limitations, including authentication and end-to-end protection.
Managing Autonomy and Public Risks
The strategy’s pursuit of greater autonomy does not amount to a plan for a self-contained Dutch quantum industry.
The document says a fully independent domestic supply chain is practically impossible because of costs and reliance on foreign hardware, advanced components, raw materials and expertise. Instead, the Netherlands aims to secure important positions in international supply chains while managing dependencies through European and other partnerships.
That approach links industrial policy to national security. The government wants to preserve access to essential technology while limiting risks associated with sensitive knowledge, investment and military applications.
Defense and other agencies will identify practical applications and develop road maps covering research, testing, infrastructure, partners and legal requirements. The strategy also calls for responsible military development and international cooperation on standards and governance.
Broader safeguards extend to privacy, equal treatment and nondiscrimination. The document warns that quantum applications could affect public values and fundamental rights, requiring attention to legal frameworks and responsible use alongside technical development.
Workforce development is another condition for success. The strategy calls for education that meets industry and public-sector needs, covering both university-trained researchers and vocational workers who can build and operate facilities. International recruitment and student mobility are also part of the approach.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate will coordinate implementation across the participating departments. Senior officials will review progress at least annually, and the House of Representatives will receive annual updates beginning in 2027.
This article relies on material computer-translated from the original information written in Dutch.
