Why SIM binding is the wrong fix for India’s cybercrime problem | #cybercrime | #infosec

“What percentage of cyber crimes will be reduced by this? And to me, it doesn’t look like anything more than 2% to 3%, not more than 2% to 3%,” said Ritesh Bhatia, founding director for cyber incident response and investigations at V4Web Cybersecurity at MediaNama’s virtual roundtable on the technical issues with SIM binding on November 13, 2026. 

The rule he was arguing against is the Department of Telecommunications’ (DoT) instruction to messaging platforms, issued in November 2025, to bind each account to the KYC-verified SIM in the user’s phone. The directions went to eight platforms, WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, Arattai, Snapchat, ShareChat, JioChat and Josh and the definition behind them could reach further.  A close source familiar with the implementation told MediaNama that DoT has since asked for checks every 24 hours, while the current compliance deadline is on December 31, 2026.

“SIM binding will definitely resolve one issue, which is the WhatsApp takeover. Now, the WhatsApp takeover scams, if you see, yeah, in quantity, there have been a lot in terms of numbers, but in terms of the money loss is being not as much what you lose when it is a digital arrest, when it’s a WhatsApp investment scam and all that. So I’m assuming that the answer by them would be approximately 2% or 3%,” he further reasoned. Even in this use case, he argued that mandating strong two-factor authentication would potentially solve the account takeover problem.

Meanwhile, Parag Kar, an independent consultant and telecom expert, argued:

“We can’t really say that the problem is not real. What we can ask is whether the solution is actually a solution, or a mechanism for something else, like surveillance.” – Parag Kar

‘Scams can’t be solved if telco KYC remains a problem’

“SIM Binding does nothing to solve for SIMs that are acquired through fraudulent means. So, one study by ISB found that 89% of alternate subscriber numbers are not Aadhaar-linked, and there are major gaps in telco KYC processes,” argued Meghna Bal, founder and director of Esya Centre and author of a research report on SIM binding. 

She added that verifying against government databases would slow telecom SIM sales and therefore they have an incentive to have an imperfect KYC system that allows for the fraudulent SIM sales. 

“Of course, there’s an incentive there, right, to not verify with government databases that the credentials you are given are correct, because that will hamper your sales.” – Meghna Bal

“Software-level compromise, credential theft, malware infections, session hijacking” are a few other mechanisms that fraudsters might use that are “not necessarily linked to weaknesses in subscriber identification,” she added. 

Experts also argued that SIM binding would inadvertently benefit telcos if the OTP-based or silent mobile verification methods are used to validate the presence of a SIM in the users’ device for the D0T-mandated periodic checks. 

“The reason the mobile operator is pushing for SIM binding is for commercial reasons. They also know that it is not practically possible to implement. They want to make money. That is why they are going ahead and saying that everybody should send SMS, and everybody should be sending SMS all the time. The whole network is going to become an SMS carrier now, right? Because more SMS means more money, both ways.”— Anand Venkatanarayanan (Dec 2025)

MediaNama’s December 2025 discussion on the impact of SIM binding also identified the fraud patterns that would survive the rule untouched, and none of them involve a messaging account running without a SIM in the phone.

Phishing.

Caller ID spoofing.

OTP theft.

SIM swaps.

VoIP-based impersonation.

Virtual numbers, international numbers and eSIMs.

Email links and email-based approaches.

India’s fraud problem is not a technical problem

In 2026’s discussion, Suman Kar, a cybersecurity researcher and chief executive of Banbreach, argued that the fraud problem in India is a social problem rather than a technical problem that calls for a technical solution, like SIM binding.

“…they want to catch you when you are the most vulnerable, which is when you are either going to work or when you are trying to wrap up work for the day and trying to come home.” – Suman Kar

Scammer will just ship a smartphone along with fake SIM

Bhatia, who interacts with victims of frauds professionally, remarked on how scammers might adapt to SIM binding. He argued that they’d ship the smartphone along with the fraudulently KYC’ed SIM card to overseas if required and that would be “equivalent to me buying a dark chocolate” when compated to the “ crores of rupees” that he might earn when the scam succeeds. 

“For scammers, this is how it is: they’ll just buy a phone, they’ll take the SIM card with them, and that’s it. Even with all this SIM Binding, we’re assuming they’re using WhatsApp Web through an Indian number. No, they have their own phones and their own SIM cards, and for them the cost of a smartphone is peanuts. So they’ll say, ‘Okay, big deal.’ Again, just like you have mule accounts in banks, you also have mule SIM card holders. They’ll just tell one watchman, ‘Hey, go buy this,’ and that’s it. Now the SIM is in some person’s name, he’s done the KYC, and the SIM along with the device is shipped to, say, Bangladesh, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, wherever the new scam centers are coming up.” – Ritesh Bhatia.

SIM Binding can’t trace the cyber criminals: 

The DoT’s order on SIM binding states the traceability of scammers operating from overseas as one of the problems.  But the speakers who spoke at the discussion questioned how SIM binding would solve the traceability of cybercriminals. Suman Kar made the same point about the fake IDs. 

“That’ll only take you to the mule account holder, right? It’ll not take you to the actual threat actor who’s sitting, say, in some other country. And the mule account holder can simply say, ‘Yes, I’m the person who owns the account. What are you going to do about it?’” –  Suman Kar

‘RBI should address the mule accounts problem’

Bhatia described a digital-arrest scenario in which the victim transfers money and the transfer lands in a mule account, not in the number or the messaging app. Therefore, he argued that the regulation should focus where and how the money flows rather than the channels communications where the fraud may happen. 

“Whenever I am the target—let’s say my father is the target for a digital arrest kind of thing—he falls for the scam. Now he transfers the money. So the money goes into a mule account. … Just imagine if there were no mule accounts, or the number of mule accounts was reduced. You don’t need to do all these kinds of things like SIM Binding.” – Ritesh Bhatia

Bhatia further argued that fixing the problem requires coordination across the DoT, the RBI, the telecom operators, the banks, and only then the messaging platforms.

“It has to be a coordinated effort—not just the DoT, but the DoT with the RBI, or, say, Vodafone and all the telecom operators, along with the banks. And then you get WhatsApp or whoever into the picture.” – Ritesh Bhatia

‘Banks and telcos already do KYC and therefore placed better to judge users’

Bal argued that KYC verification, whether for a bank account or a phone number, happens at the bank or telco level, so those entities are better placed to enforce identity-based restrictions than a service provider one layer removed from that verification.

“The KYC verification—whether in the case of a bank account or in the case of a phone number—is happening at either the telco level or the bank level. So ideally, those are the service providers that would have better line of sight on who the people are that are getting [access], or would be able to enforce better identity-based restrictions than a [messaging] service provider that is one level removed from that.” – Meghna Bal.

How can a six-hour logout stop a three-minute scam? 

Suman Kar timed the fraud and argued that the scam unfolds far faster than any logout window the rule might impose.

“The money moves out from your account and then it […] goes out of the financial system in about 2-3 minutes. The call that would […] lure you to make that transaction takes another 2-3 minutes. So, the whole scam takes about 5 minutes to pull off. Do you really think that a 6-hour, even a 4-hour or a 1-hour window is going to stop people?” – Suman Kar

However, after this discussion, industry sources told MediaNama that the periodic checks for the presence of the SIM have to be at every 24 hours. The 6-hour window that Suman Kar was referring to is the six-hour auto logout mechanism from web-based sessions. However, later in Parliament, MP Pemmasani Chandra Shekar stated in Rajya Sabha on April 2, 2026 that risk-based analysis will be implemented instead of standard six-hour logouts. 

During MediaNama’s first discussion on SIM Binding, cybersecurity researcher Anand Venkataraman also spoke that risk index as an alternative to Sim Binding.

“So you could take a whole bunch of this information and create a composite risk index and say whether this is a problematic user or not. Many banking applications use some version of a composite risk index, including some UPI apps. It is perfectly possible to create a composite risk index without getting involved in SIM binding for cybercrime.”  — Anand Venkatanarayanan

You can catch up the full discussion on YouTube:

Note: This discussion is being organised with support from Esya Centre.

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