Hackers Use Stolen FortiGate VPN Credentials to Access Corporate Networks and Deploy Custom Malware | #ransomware | #cybercrime

A threat actor known as “tcherber” is selling and using stolen FortiGate VPN logins to get into company networks. The same person also builds custom malware, including a stealer, a remote desktop tool, and ransomware.

The campaign shows how one weak VPN password can open the way to data theft and file encryption. The actor does not need a new Fortinet bug. Many of the logins come from guessing weak passwords, using default ones such as guest/guest and admin/admin, or reusing leaked ones.

This is the same pattern seen in the FortiBleed credential campaign that hit Fortinet devices worldwide earlier this year.

Researchers at Cyderes studied the operation and traced it back to one build path in the malware. Analysts at the firm’s Howler Cell team noted that a Rust binary leaked the folder name “/home/tcherber”.

That clue linked the malware to a Go-based VPN toolkit, a ransomware strain, and a live control panel. Their full technical report covers the findings in detail.

Hackers Use Stolen FortiGate VPN Credentials

Cyderes found a database holding more than 500 FortiGate VPN credentials from many countries. Logs showed the actor connecting with full root-level tunnels into several victim networks during May and June 2026. Some sessions lasted for hours.

The toolkit is written in Go and works mostly on its own. It connects to the VPN, waits about 20 seconds for the tunnel to settle, and then maps the internal routes.

Next it queries Active Directory over LDAP and writes the results into report files. Other modules scan ports, list SMB shares, and test which logins work on Windows machines. The toolkit also has a SonicWall module. Its comments and messages are in Russian.

The actor also advertises on a forum called rehubcom.pro. The posts offer access to FortiGate and other appliances, plus custom loader builds.

Attack Overview (Source – Cyderes)

The seller skips targets in CIS countries and sorts victims by company revenue. This points to a business that sells access to other criminals. It is similar to the access-broker behavior seen in FortiGate attacks on edge devices, where stolen logins were sold and reused.

Once inside, the actor can use the VPN to reach the internal network like a normal employee. Stolen passwords are hard to spot in logs because the logins look valid. That is why a leaked VPN password can be worse than an unpatched bug.

Custom Malware: Fake Windows Update, Rust Loader, and Enigma Ransomware

The malware chain starts with a file named setup.exe that pretends to be a Windows Update installer. It shows a short “Installing… Please wait” window while it quietly drops a PowerShell script.

The script adds the C: drive to the Defender exclusion list. It then downloads a file called loader.cer and decodes it with certutil. A similar certutil trick appeared in a BlankGrabber stealer chain earlier this year.

The decoded file is a Rust loader. It checks for sandboxes by looking at memory size, disk size, usernames, and tools such as Wireshark and x64dbg.

If the checks pass, it downloads two more payloads. The first is a stealer that takes browser passwords, cookies, wallets, FTP and email data, and files from the Desktop and Documents folders. It sends a ZIP file to the attacker over HTTP and through a Telegram bot.

Rust loader delivery (Source – Cyderes)

The second payload is an HVNC implant. HVNC opens a hidden desktop, so the attacker can use the victim’s logged-in browser without the user seeing anything.

The implant uses AES-256-GCM encryption for its traffic. It also patches AMSI and ETW, which weakens Windows scanning and logging. It can bypass UAC and set up persistence.

The same developer built Enigma ransomware. It deletes shadow copies and turns off recovery. It also clears event logs, stops Hyper-V machines, and kills 125 processes, including database and backup software.

Files are encrypted with ChaCha12 and get the .ENIGMA extension. Ransom notes are named README_ENIGMA.txt and list the contact Enigma1@aol.com. Cyderes found no data upload feature in the ransomware.

Cyderes also found an open control panel at 158.94.209.138 with 178 active bots. It showed builds dated September 2026, so the infrastructure was still active. Groups such as The Gentlemen ransomware crew also use Fortinet VPNs as their main way in.

Reset all FortiGate and SonicWall VPN passwords. Turn on multi-factor authentication for every remote user. Remove default accounts and review VPN logs for long or odd sessions. Block the IPs below and hunt for the file names and registry values listed in the report.

Look for a Run key named “SecurityHealth” and scheduled tasks named “S0”, “MU”, “Upd”, and “WindowsUpdate”.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

TypeIndicatorDescriptionSHA-2566bddf59e2a5065255cfc90d2e2e66e3bfd4a7cbf4e0b6341b4da93b574cc4f53setup.exeSHA-2566aef80514237808dfe25621a8912422d20a8414bc2054008a119e541166821b5setup.ps1SHA-2567cb59abaa268ac66461447773d46bb0b0e5e2568e35e1a8f1d07ac2ec57f67a6svchost.exe (Rust loader)SHA-256d0f0734d4e31ec126da43a46896d0cd761e5532c0c385db6226cc5a6927d7722stealer.exeSHA-256278762dfc0f743216a475919bdc9ecc59735bcc247bba5b7b468fc475407ec6ahvnc.exeSHA-256859802972787164683cd78d796b9581ffde1bcee2a708eb20b14f3a8fb276599workvideo.exeSHA-256abd43578b135df61f49844087af0b372ae10b2f27721ad6ba09710760ab0b240Enigma ransomware binarySHA-256fc4755e346c9f2fe11f4ba6546f3e8bd3b8711efbcf2e417307ea9671a93d0f3agent.exeSHA-256fad8f76afec90c888b4a739539deae250320fd49c34ef8458833b356ea9b7767StealerSHA-256f9964a8d9d01052d9bebe057deadd7ce9d794e8296e2a72229f8ae4aa62ae224DropperSHA-256178f890f62db90738b11300dd27253724 0b1c8a599d2ebeccdea01654811fed0HVNC (no space in the original hash)IP:Port93.152.223.30:5000Main C2 for loader, stealer, and HVNC payloadsIP:Port93.152.220.87:5000Additional C2IP:Port93.152.223.30:5555HVNC default C2 portIP158.94.209.138Standalone C2 Panel v3URLhxxps://158.94.209.138.sslip.ioC2 panel web interfaceURLhxxp://158.94.209.138/agent.exePanel payload URLEmailEnigma1@aol.comRansom contactFileREADME_ENIGMA.txt, .ENIGMARansom note and encrypted file extensionDomainrehubcom.proForum used to advertise the services

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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