The cybersecurity goals of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are not just crucial, but they are the very backbone of the digital ambitions and resilience of its member countries. However, achieving these goals is a daunting task in the face of a global security landscape that is increasingly shaped by escalating geopolitical tensions.
ASEAN 2045 Vision and Cybersecurity
At the 46th ASEAN Summit in May 2025 in Kuala Lumpur, the regional organization adopted the ASEAN 2045: Our Shared Future vision document. The document would serve as a blueprint to guide long-term and deeper regional integration and resilience. It comprises six chapters, including the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Strategic Plan. Two of the nine strategic goals in the APSC outline priorities related to the cybersecurity of ASEAN.
Strategic Goal 4 of the APSC Strategic Plan envisions an “ASEAN that remains a primary driving force in shaping the regional architecture and contributes towards a rules-based international order amidst geopolitical tensions and rivalries. This vision applies to cyberspace.
To that end, the goal calls for promoting “exchanges, interactions, and confidence-building measures (CBMs) in current and emerging fields of security,” including cybersecurity.
Strategic Goal Five of the APSC Strategic Plan envisions an “ASEAN that is a contributor to the maintenance of international peace and security through upholding the rules-based multilateral system and international law.” This vision also applies to cyberspace.
To that end, the goal calls for strengthening efforts to combat transnational crimes, including online scams and cybercrime. It also calls for enhanced cooperation to “respond to emerging challenges from the misuse and exploitation of information and communication technology (ICTs) and artificial intelligence (AI).” Such cooperation would be crucial to building “confidence and trust in network and digital infrastructure.”
Complementing the APSC Strategic Plan is the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Strategic Plan. In particular, Strategic Goal Three of the AEC strategic plan relates to “expanded and enhanced ASEAN’s digital connectivity.” Expanded connectivity necessitates strengthening “cybersecurity measures to protect digital ecosystems, enhance online safety, combat online scams, and enhance trust in digital services, including use of online security technologies and applications.”
Looking beyond the jargon and motherhood statements in the ASEAN 2045 vision document, it becomes clear that the region’s cybersecurity goals are not just about fortifying the autonomy of its member countries against external forces. They also hold the promise of fostering economic development and trade, thereby ensuring continued regional stability.
This interpretation could be discerned by juxtaposing the ASEAN 2045 vision document with the speech by the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim, at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) 2025 in Singapore. Malaysia holds the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2025.
Geopolitical Tensions Impact Cyberspace
However, Prime Minister Anwar’s speech was overshadowed by the more cautionary and even confrontational messages from Western leaders about geopolitical tensions.
For example, European Commission Vice-President and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas spoke out against China—including its cyber activities—and reminded Asian countries about Russia’s actions in Ukraine. The Netherlands’ Defense Minister, Ruben Brekelmans, in a media interview on the sidelines of SLD, said that China, which Western powers have accused of supporting Russia’s war effort, is conducting cyber espionage on the Dutch aerospace, maritime, and semiconductor sectors.
One could perceive these messages as cautionary notes to Malaysia’s plans as the current ASEAN Chair—for ASEAN to deepen cooperation with Russia. Based on the ASEAN-Russia cooperation framework, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) mechanism could enhance practical cooperation with Russia in various areas, including cybersecurity. This cooperation could impact ASEAN’s cybersecurity goals and the geopolitical tensions surrounding them.
US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned about the imminent threat of China to the Indo-Pacific and how regional countries’ economic cooperation with China could complicate the US’ defense decision-making during times of tension. One could perceive this message as a cautionary note regarding ASEAN’s plans to sign the upgraded ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) at the upcoming 47th ASEAN Leaders’ Summit in October 2025. The ACFTA encompasses several areas, including the digital economy, and its signing could impact the geopolitical landscape and ASEAN’s cybersecurity goals.
Outside the diplomatic space of the SLD, cyberwarfare-related activities continue to feature in geopolitical tensions.
In April 2025, China accused the US of launching cyberattacks on Chinese critical information infrastructure during the Asian Winter Games in February 2025. In May 2025, China and Taiwan traded accusations of cyberattacks. More recently, on June 5, 2025, China offered rewards for information relating to cyberattacks purportedly conducted by Taiwan.
China’s attribution of the US and Taiwan’s cyber activities could signal its growing confidence as a cyber power, and this foreshadows deeper contestation between the US and China in cyberspace.
On June 1, 2025, Ukrainian drones struck deep inside Russia, successfully targeting military airfields and destroying nuclear-capable long-range Tupolev bombers. Concurrently, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (HUR) claimed that it had conducted cyberattacks on Russia’s state-owned aircraft manufacturer Tupolev. These cyberattacks likely aimed to wreck Russia’s capability to replace its strategic bombers and turn the tide on the war in Ukraine.
More importantly, Ukraine’s tactics—which are studied for a potential China-Taiwan conflict—highlight that cyberspace contestation remains an integral part of an asymmetric conflict between opponents with incommensurate military and economic resources.
Engaging External Partners Will Get Tougher
ASEAN countries would find themselves in a more challenging position in balancing relations with their dialogue partners—such as China, Russia, the US, and the European Union—as these partners fall deeper into geopolitical tensions or indirectly engage in conflicts that show little signs of ending.
Specifically, initiatives by ASEAN to promote digital trade, technology, and cybersecurity cooperation with China and Russia—either at the national or regional level—as a hedge against strategic uncertainties would raise concerns and counteraction among Western powers and their Asian allies.
The ASEAN 2045: Our Shared Future vision document recognizes that ASEAN should seize the opportunities that such geopolitical tensions present. It also represents a continuation of ASEAN’s preferred brand of inclusive and non-discriminatory cooperation with all external partners, including in addressing cybersecurity issues.
However, 20 years (2025–2045) is a long time. Whether ASEAN successfully realizes this vision, including in cyberspace, could, to a significant extent, depend on whether tensions among its external partners are maintained, improved, or worsened over time.
