The Cybersecurity Golden Hour: Timeline of an Effective Incident Response | #hacking | #cybersecurity | #infosec | #comptia | #pentest | #ransomware


 
Cyberattackers Can Play the Long Game
April 1, 2024: The dark web bad guy, E.G., notices an exploit for sale for CVE-2024-29201 on one of their favorite hacker forums. They check their scanning logs and identify networks with the vulnerable jump server. Using other open databases, they map the networks to companies. And, finally, they check their recovered passwords for matching email addresses. For just 0.005 bitcoin (stolen, naturally), they’ve got a working exploit and a candidate list of usernames, passwords and servers.
April 4, 2024: E.G. tries out the list of usernames from a compromised host in a hosting company in Hong Kong. They find the jump server at and are able to login. Because JumpServer is part of the infrastructure, the login from Hong Kong isn’t noticed. However, firewall does log the event. It’s flagged low-to-medium risk because the login seems valid even though the geographic zone is unusual; therefore, it remains in the security information and event management (SIEM) system for correlation. No incident is created.
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Automated Detection Tools Pick Up Anomalies
April 5, 2024, 02:14: E.G. comes back, logs in and abuses the unpatched JumpServer flaw. They download the credentials database.
02:20: E.G. uses the jump server to login and elevate privileges using Sudo to “root” to a server they think will not be noticed, called HR benefits. The SIEM sees a login at an unusual time to a highly privileged account and opens an automated case with low priority: “Suspicious login of privileged user.”
02:26: E.G. uses HTTP to download their favorite rootkit from the internet to the HR Benefits server. The firewall logs arrive at the SIEM, and the case is bumped up in priority: outbound HTTP to the internet at this time is unusual, and the rootkit file signature matches a known Indication of Compromise.
02:27: Security orchestration, automation and response (SOAR) blocks further outbound internet connections from the HR Benefits server. E.G. doesn’t notice.
02:30: E.G. unpacks the rootkit and launches it. The outbound connection to a command-and-control (C2) server has been blocked, so E.G. moves laterally using the credentials they got from the jump server (elevating privileges with Sudo) to a new home, the Dev Staging server, hoping that it will be unprotected. E.G. copies over the rootkit directly, without triggering an alert.
02:34: E.G. launches the rootkit, which successfully connects outbound to their C2 server. This gives E.G. a channel back into the network if the jump server is shut off.
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With Anomalous Action Detected, It’s Time to Respond
02:35: The login, privilege escalation and rootkit process are noticed by the Dev Staging server’s endpoint detection and response software, and log entries are sent to the SIEM. EDR software is running on the server, but it’s in monitor mode, so the process keeps running and E.G. stays connected.
02:36: The SIEM correlates the attempted outbound connection, the successful outbound connection, the unusual HTTP download and the unusual login. It bumps up the incident priority and attaches other supporting information, such as the login to the Dev Staging server. Because the HR and Dev Staging servers aren’t rated as highly critical assets, the incident is still running under the radar.
02:42: E.G. starts to move laterally again. They are looking for something valuable to exfiltrate, so the next stop is a database server. Another login, another Sudo, but this time the server is marked as critical infrastructure. A connection from a suspected host to a new host at 2 a.m. makes the SIEM take notice. This is now a top priority alert that pops up on the analyst’s urgent screen.
02:45: Meanwhile, E.G. has taken a few moments to connect to the database to see what interesting data might be inside that’s worth stealing, at the same time launching the download of a ransomware toolkit that starts to scan for file servers that can be encrypted and held for ransom.
02:48: The analyst declares a probable incident and begins the containment playbook. The SOAR disables the compromised account E.G. was using, starts to close down Secure Shell sessions, and quarantines the two noncritical servers. E.G. is booted off the servers, but is able to get back into the Dev Staging server because of their existing C2 connection. However, because the server is quarantined, they can’t get out to the rest of the network.
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