Introduction
The rapid development of encrypted digital networks has raised new issues in global biochemical security. While the dark web is not a primary marketplace for chemical and biological warfare agents, it is a critical enabler for access to dual-use precursor chemicals, equipment, and research materials through anonymous and decentralised networks.
The dark web refers to an invisible section of the internet that relies on encryption and anonymity to conceal the identities and locations of its users. In contrast to the surface web, which can be accessed through standard browsers, dark web services require specialised networks such as Tor (“The Onion Router”).[1] Tor reroutes communication through multiple nodes, making user activity difficult to track, thus increasing the scope of anonymity. Originally developed by researchers with support from institutions like the United States (US) Naval Research Laboratory, Tor was intended to enable secure communication for journalists, activists, and government officials operating in high-risk environments.[2] Over time, however, this infrastructure has evolved into a repository for anonymous online marketplaces that facilitate a range of illicit economic activities.
Among the most prominent of these marketplaces was the ‘Silk Road,’ which operated between 2011 to 2013 and enabled users to purchase narcotics using Bitcoin.[3] Its eventual shutdown by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) demonstrated the scale of such operations—over US$3 million in transactional holdings was seized—and the capacity of law enforcement to intervene.[4] The resilience of other platforms, such as AlphaBay and Hansa Market, through their better security features and broader offerings, demonstrates the adaptability of dark web trade. Their closure in 2017 under ‘Operation Bayonet,’ led by the Dutch National Police, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), and the FBI, revealed marketplaces trading over 350,000 illicit commodities, including opioids and malware, as well as providing money-laundering services. Only their administrators were placed under arrest— two in Germany and one in Thailand.[5] The lack of information around the buyers of these illicit materials highlights the anonymity these platforms provide and why they use difficult-to-trace currency. Relying on anonymity and trust between vendors and buyers, they have created a structurally flexible marketplace that can evade detection.
Despite extensive research on narcotics trafficking and cybercrime, the implications of the dark web as a platform for biochemical security threats remain comparatively underexplored. However, the availability of narcotics and chemical precursors is clear evidence of the foundational infrastructure they provide for the illicit trade and transfer of dangerous biological agents and chemical agents.
Biochemical threats encompass chemical weapons such as sarin; toxic industrial chemicals including chlorine; biological agents like anthrax; and delivery systems like drones or explosives, capable of producing large-scale public health and national security consequences. International frameworks that preceded the dark web, such as the Biological Weapons Convention[a] and the Chemical Weapons Convention,[b] regulate the development, stockpiling, and transfer of such materials.[6] However, enforcement mechanisms face increasing challenges in an environment where encrypted digital networks enable decentralised and concealed procurement pathways.
Current evidence does not record the dark web being widely used for direct acquisition of chemical or biological weapons systems. Instead, its significance lies in the growing trade of dual-use precursor chemicals, laboratory equipment, and research compounds on it. These materials, while legitimate in many contexts, can be repurposed for illicit experimentation or small-scale synthesis. Studies by organisations such as the RAND Corporation and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction indicate that dark web marketplaces are actively used to procure precursor compounds for synthetic opioids and stimulants,[7] a shift from direct weaponisation to enabling components within broader illicit production chains.
This issue has high policy relevance in the Indian context. As one of the world’s largest producers of pharmaceuticals and industrial chemicals, India plays a prominent role in global supply chains for active pharmaceutical ingredients and related products. Regulatory oversight is exercised through institutions such as the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) and the Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN).[8] However, the rapid expansion of digital connectivity, e-commerce platforms, and encrypted financial systems has introduced new vulnerabilities. These law enforcement agencies have already documented instances of narcotics networks in India leveraging dark web platforms to procure synthetic drugs (see Table 1).
This convergence of encrypted marketplaces, large-scale chemical production, and anonymous financial systems creates a complex and evolving policy challenge. Dark web platforms facilitate clandestine communication, cross-border procurement, and fragmented supply chains that operate beyond the purview of traditional monitoring frameworks. As a result, they function as structural enablers that can accelerate the movement of hazardous materials by exploiting regulatory gaps and providing technological anonymity. India is at a critical juncture where it needs to overcome gaps in regulatory processes that have permitted previous infiltrations and improve upon tracking of illicit biochemical materials that can be traded over the dark web.
Dark Web Activity in India and Globally
Dark web markets, also referred to as cryptomarkets, are online black markets that operate on Tor and another privacy-focused network, the Invisible Internet Project (I2P).[9] Structurally, these platforms mirror legitimate e-commerce websites by offering product listings, vendor profiles, customer reviews, and dispute resolution mechanisms—features that foster trust among anonymous users and contribute to the persistence of illicit trade despite repeated law enforcement crackdowns.
The resilience of dark web markets comes from four technological attributes: anonymity services, encrypted communication channels, decentralised hosting infrastructure, and cryptocurrency-based payment systems. Since these features are not based on the goods being traded, the same platforms can also support transactions involving weapons components, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, and dual-use chemical products. Enforcement actions targeting individual marketplaces rarely disrupt the broader ecosystem as participants migrate to alternative platforms, adopt new digital identities, and continue operations in a fragmented but adaptive network.[10]
From a biosecurity perspective, the primary threat lies in the facilitation of transactions due to the protected, anonymity-forward environment. The dark web enables individuals to connect with international suppliers, access technical expertise to carry out illegal activities, and procure laboratory materials with minimal oversight. This weakens traditional regulatory mechanisms that rely on traceability of transactions and jurisdictional control, thereby increasing the risk of illicit experimentation involving chemical precursor material and specialised equipment.
Evidence from India indicates that dark-web-related narcotics trafficking remains limited and measurable. The NCB reported approximately 92 cases involving cryptocurrency-linked dark web transactions out of a total of 1,025 narcotics trade cases between January 2020 and April 2024.[11] This represents a small proportion of overall narcotics cases in India and an even smaller share of global dark web activity, which is concentrated in Europe and North America.[12] However, it demonstrates the presence of such networks within the Indian context.
The nature of these cases reveals some clear patterns: most involve synthetic drugs and diverted pharmaceutical products, such as lysergic acid diethylamide (f), 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), ketamine, and prescription opioids.[13] Investigations have uncovered cross-border procurement pipelines where buyers engage vendors through encrypted platforms and receive shipments of illegal products through postal and courier services. For example, law enforcement operations in Bengaluru cracked down on a pan-Indian network that imported LSD and MDMA from European dark web vendors using wallets like Monero and USDT that employ cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum, Tron, and Bitcoin.[14] Subsequent arrests from Mumbai and Gujarat further illustrate the integration of dark web markets with traditional supply chains, including attempts to import large quantities of narcotics through international logistics channels linked to dark web vendors. Such cases demonstrate how digital anonymity intersects with physical freight distribution systems, creating hybrid networks that are difficult to monitor and regulate.[15]
Dark web markets generate substantial revenues globally, with narcotics trade alone estimated at approximately US$470 million in 2022, growing to over US$2 billion in 2025.[16],[17] The commonly traded drugs include cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, and MDMA. What began with trading based on cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin moved to Monero when Bitcoin announced its traceability in 2017. Most transactions now rely on other untraceable wallets and currencies.[18]
India’s position is relatively peripheral in terms of consumption, with an estimated 103,866 daily Tor users,[19] but this obscures a strong structural risk. Its chemical and pharmaceutical industry, valued at approximately US$220 billion in 2023 and projected to reach US$300–450 billion by 2028–2030, produces over 80,000 products.[20] This industrial base positions India as a critical supplier of chemical precursors and pharmaceutical materials in global supply chains. The intersection of this high production capacity with dark-web-enabled procurement networks raises concerns regarding the tracking and diversion of dual-use substances.
Beyond narcotics, indicators of broader cybercrime activity highlight additional vulnerabilities in India. The presence of stolen biometric and individual data on dark web forums that can be used to extract health records, such as data extracted from the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), provide potential for misuse of sensitive scientific information.[21] Such data may be sold over the dark web, posing privacy risks for individuals whose biological and biometric data has been used by the ICMR, or even for the general population, by allowing malicious actors to exploit such data beyond their originally intended purposes, creating risks of unauthorised secondary research, profiling, and other uses involving sensitive biological information.[22],[23] The World Health Organization (WHO) has repeatedly warned that unauthorised access, theft, and misuse of biological data can exacerbate biosecurity threats, particularly when actors exploit gaps in existing digital safeguards, upgrading its own recommendations for biosafety standards for patient records as well.[24]
The absence of publicly confirmed cases in India involving direct trade of advanced chemical or biological weapons should be interpreted with caution. The heavily encrypted, transnational nature of dark web activity complicates detection, attribution, and timely disclosure. Investigations often span multiple jurisdictions and can take years, while marketplaces themselves are highly volatile, frequently changing their names and operational structures. These factors create operational challenges for law enforcement, suggesting that observable cases probably represent only a fraction of actual activity.
Table 1: Incidents and Seizures
| Case | Enforcement Outcomes (Arrests and Seizures) | Key Details |
| Operation DisrupTor (September 2020, Europe and the US)[25] |
· 179 arrests
· 500 kg of multiple drugs seized
· 63 firearms confiscated
· Digital assets worth US$6.5 million in cash and virtual currencies
| · Huge dark web marketplace crackdown |
| The Zambada Cartel (2023, National Capital Region, India)[26] |
· 22 arrests
· 29,013 LSD blots and 472 g MDMA seized
· INR 51.38 lakh cash recovered
|
· Largest dark web LSD cartel at the time
· Five-star vendor network
· Kingpins placed in judicial custody
|
| Tenzin Orgil Case (May 2024, California, US)[27] |
· One arrest
· Methamphetamine recipe and MDMA precursor chemicals seized
· Digital assets not specified
|
· Dark web vendor ‘iBULK,’ a clandestine lab operator sourcing Chinese precursor chemicals
· Sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment
|
|
Operation Pangea XVII
(2024–2025, across 90 countries)[28]
|
· 769 arrests
· 50.4 million doses of illicit pharmaceuticals seized
· US$65 million in value
|
· Largest coordinated operation
· 123 criminal groups dismantled
· Over 13,000 websites/pages shut down
|
|
Operation SpecTor
(February 2025, international)[29]
|
· 288 arrests
· 850 kg of drugs seized, including 64 kg of fentanyl
· Over US$53.4 million seized
|
· Most arrests in Joint Criminal Opioid Dark Web Enforcement (J-CODE) history
· Dark web marketplace seizure
|
| Dark web Vendor Case (September 2025, Canada)[30] |
· Seven arrests
· 75 kg of various narcotics and 10,000 prescription and non-prescription pills seized
| · One of the largest multi-agency investigations of dark web drug-trafficking operations[31] |
|
Operation Melon— Ketamelon bust
(July 2025, Kochi, India)[32]
|
· Two arrests
· 1,127 LSD blots and 131.66 g ketamine seized
· INR 70 lakh in cryptocurrency and INR 35.12 lakh street value
|
· India’s Level 4 dark web vendor
· ~600 shipments in 14 months
· UK link (‘Gunga Din’)
· Tied to Dr Seuss global network
|
|
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Fentanyl Seizures
(2024, US)[33]
|
· Multiple arrests
· 60 million pills and 8000 lbs of fentanyl powder seized[34]
|
· Indicates scale of fentanyl crisis
· Seizures continued into 2025 at increasing levels
|
|
DEA Seizures
(January–April 2025, US)[35]
|
· Multiple arrests
· 22.2 million fentanyl pills and over 3,100 pounds of powder seized
|
· Year-to-date 2025 figures
· Widespread fentanyl contamination
|
|
Nitazene and Precursor Seizures
(September 2025, US airports and Mexico)[36]
Part of the Operation Lionfish-Mayag III (30 June–13 July 2025)
|
· Multiple interceptions coordinated by INTERPOL across 18 countries in Asia and North America
· 190,000 fentanyl tablets and 1.7 tonnes of methamphetamine seized[37]
· Digital value not specified
|
· Emerging synthetic opioid threat (Nitazene’s potency is up to 200× that of morphine)
· Shipments linked to the UK and China
· Difficult detection
|
| Global dark web synthetic drug trade (2020–2025, South and Southeast Asia, Mekong)[38] |
· Multiple operations
· Precursor chemicals, synthetic drugs, and pharmaceuticals seized
· Millions in digital assets
|
· Growth of novel precursors to evade detection
· Reliance on cryptocurrency
· Expansion of transnational dark-web-enabled supply chains
|
Source: Authors’ own, collected from multiple open sources.
Chemical and Biological Agents on the Dark Web
There is limited publicly available data regarding the sale of weapon-grade chemical and biological agents on dark web marketplaces. This reflects the severe legal consequences associated with such activities and the inherently clandestine nature of the actors involved. Much of the existing research focuses on marketplace structures, user behaviour, and trade in related or precursor materials rather than confirmed transactions involving fully weaponised agents.
Early research by Nicolas Christin (2013) demonstrated that dark web markets function as sophisticated trading platforms with similar organisational features as legitimate e-commerce sites. His research revealed the online Silk Road as being predominantly used for narcotics trade and identified thousands of listings for controlled substances, along with smaller quantities of chemical compounds and laboratory equipment.[39] His findings illustrated the capacity of dark web platforms to facilitate anonymous cross-border transactions involving a diverse range of goods, including those relevant to chemical and biological research.
Subsequent studies by Judith Aldridge, Masarah Paquet-Clouston, and David Décary-Hétu (2016) further examined the organisational dynamics of cryptomarkets.[40] Their work highlights how vendors frequently offer pharmaceutical products, research chemicals, and precursor substances in addition to narcotics on the dark web.[41] Reputation systems, escrow services, and user feedback mechanisms play a critical role in sustaining trust within these anonymous environments, thereby enabling continued trade.
Open-source intelligence has also identified isolated instances involving biochemical agents on the dark web, with intent to purchase or develop. For example, ricin, a toxin derived from castor beans, has appeared in dark-web-related investigations. In a 2014 US undercover operation, a suspect expressed their intent to purchase ricin and claimed to have prospective buyers. While such cases demonstrate interest and intent, they do not necessarily confirm successful acquisition or the authenticity of the substances involved.[42]
Similarly, references to anthrax[c] have periodically surfaced on underground forums.[43] However, experts warn that many dark web listings are unreliable, as vendors may misrepresent products to attract buyers.[44] Analysts such as Molly J. Hall and others emphasise the significant psychological and political impact of even small-scale biological incidents.[45] While the reporting of biological agents on the dark web may be exaggerated, even a small amount and interest in the same from buyers represents a significant social and political concern.
More substantiated concerns have emerged in cases involving attempted acquisitions of biological toxins and chemical precursors. For instance, a teenager in the UK attempted to obtain the deadly toxin abrin through a dark web platform, but the transaction was intercepted by authorities.[46] Among chemicals, organophosphate compounds have been identified in online listings. While these substances have legitimate industrial and agricultural uses, they are chemically related to nerve agents such as sarin and VX. Analysts such as Jean-Pascal Zanders (1999) argue that proliferation risks are more closely linked to the movement of such precursor chemicals than to fully developed agents.[47]
Empirical research also highlights the prevalence of online trade in synthetic drug precursors. Bryce Pardo’s work (2019) on transitioning markets as a platform for synthetic opioids demonstrates how vendors advertise these chemicals using technical specifications and ship them through conventional logistics networks, often facilitated by cryptocurrency payments.[48] Although primarily linked to narcotics production, these practices highlight the broader issue of dual-use chemicals circulating through poorly regulated online ecosystems.[49]
The adaptability of dark web markets was particularly evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, when vendors included counterfeit vaccines, vaccination certificates, and unlicenced pharmaceutical products among their wares.[50] This illustrated the capacity of these platforms to integrate biomedical goods into existing illicit trade networks in response to changing demand.[51]
Taken together, the available research suggests that the principal biosecurity concern is not the widespread sale of weaponised agents, but the circulation of dual-use chemicals, laboratory reagents,[d] and specialised materials through anonymised procurement channels.[52] These channels, supported by global logistics networks and digital financial infrastructures, create strong barriers to monitoring and regulation.
The absence of verified large-scale transactions involving chemical or biological weapons, therefore, should not be interpreted as an absence of risk. Instead, it reflects the limitations of detection and attribution within encrypted transnational environments. The anonymity and decentralisation of dark web markets continue to pose challenges for biosecurity governance by enabling the discreet movement of hazardous materials and knowledge across borders.
Instructional Content on the Dark Web
Apart from facilitating the trade of physical commodities, anonymised networks provide means of sharing technical information on chemistry, biotechnology, and hazardous materials. Hidden services accessible through networks like Tor grant users access to encrypted forums, discussion boards, and document-sharing sites where they can exchange manuals, experimental descriptions, and simplified guides related to chemical and biological material, as well as information on toxin extraction and chemical synthesis.[53] Access to these networks is often invite-only, allowing a limited number of users.
Researchers studying extremist and underground digital ecosystems have noted that such environments create hubs for amateur chemists, technically inclined hobbyists, and politically radicalised individuals to converge. Maura Conway (2019) notes that encrypted platforms enable the transmission of operational information and ideological messaging.[54] Gregory D. Koblentz (2020) argues that digital communication technologies have enhanced access to knowledge concerning chemical and biological hazards by removing traditional barriers to expertise.[55]
Parallel research into the so-called ‘Do It Yourself (DIY) biology’ movement reveals how increased access to scientific knowledge can lead to security concerns. Kathleen Vogel (2012) points out that the reinterpretation of scientific knowledge in informal contexts may lead individuals to experiment with biological materials outside institutional regulatory oversight,[56] which can lead to unsafe practices, accidental exposure, and contamination risk.
The transmission of procedural information in underground forums relies on scientific literature, historical technical manuals, and open-access academic publications. In many cases, users extract elements from legitimate scientific research and repackage them into simplified, step-by-step instructions, omitting ethical guidelines, biosafety protocols, and institutional oversight mechanisms that are integral to formal scientific practice. As a result, while the information becomes more accessible to non-expert audiences, the underlying procedures may remain complex and require specialised knowledge.
Experts on terrorism and unconventional weapons have also identified attempts by extremist actors to acquire technical information related to hazardous materials. Adam Dolnik (2006) observes that such organisations frequently look for instructional content concerning chemical and biological agents on online forums and digital archives.[57] This may include translated scientific texts, chemical formulations, and discussions related to rudimentary delivery mechanisms.
While discussions within anonymised online forums may sometimes extend to methods for disseminating hazardous substances, they are unlikely to be readily operationalised due to the expertise required to do so. However, the collaborative nature of online communities allows users to exchange ideas, critique experimental approaches, and incrementally refine technical concepts.
These knowledge-sharing networks challenge the assumption that limited technical expertise would act as a barrier to the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The exchange of technical information in anonymised digital spaces carries a latent security risk as the increasing availability of scientific knowledge may encourage unsafe experimentation and gradually lower the barrier for amateurs to experiment with hazardous substances. Furthermore, the spread of technical knowledge in digitally mediated environments may outpace regulatory adaptation, allowing diffusion of potentially dangerous expertise before policymakers can respond. Similar developments can be seen in other digitally enabled threat environments where online gaming platforms and encrypted chatrooms have been employed for radicalisation, recruitment, and dissemination of extreme content. Similarly, anonymous digital environments have been leveraged for terror financing.[58]
Tacit knowledge is a key concept in biosecurity research that helps explain this changing dynamic of removing barriers to knowledge and access in the development of chemical and biological weapons. It refers to skills and understanding acquired through hands-on laboratory experience and iterative experimentation, something that cannot be conveyed through written instructions or manuals. Sharing procedural guidance and practical tips through anonymised forums does not diminish the importance of tacit knowledge, but it can reduce some of the barriers to acquiring such expertise.
The Dark Web’s Financial Pipeline
The financial layer is crucial to ensure the resilience of dark web markets, and cryptocurrency serves as its backbone. Transactions are typically conducted through escrow services provided by dark web marketplaces. Cryptocurrencies were initially adopted across dark web markets due to their ability to allow some anonymity to buyers. However, dark web vendors and buyers are now increasingly opting for completely untraceable and privacy-focused cryptocurrencies, such as Monero, a wallet-linked cryptocurrency that does not allow viewing of transaction histories or balance information.
In practice, the flow of money on the dark web is not limited to a single cryptocurrency. For instance, the ‘Operation Melon’ narcotics case (see Table 1) demonstrates the deployment of sophisticated money-laundering practices, including storing funds in stablecoins like USDT (Tether) and exchanging them on international platforms. This type of hybrid financial system not only complicates tracing but undermines the efficacy of anti-money-laundering frameworks. In some countries, money laundering is done by ‘cashing out’ cryptocurrencies using one-time payment identifiers, through Unified Payment Interface (UPI) systems, and hawala networks. In India, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) found instances where money was laundered through payment gateways, and digital or cryptocurrencies.[59]
Profits generated from dark web trafficking are increasingly being converted into cryptocurrencies, which often fall outside the scope of conventional anti-money-laundering systems. Law enforcement agencies have identified several cryptocurrency wallets associated with illegal marketplaces, highlighting the scale of such financial activity.
In certain regions, including South Asia, informal value transfer systems[e] are used to convert cryptocurrency into fiat currency, compounding challenges for law enforcement. For instance, studies by the Indian Enforcement Directorate (ED) have identified cases where Bitcoin transactions, carried out on dark web markets, were exploited by narcotics smugglers who used hawala channels to convert the cryptocurrency into cash, thereby evading banking channels and anti-money-laundering regulations.[60] From a biosecurity perspective, the anonymity of this financial system lowers barriers to acquiring controlled materials across international borders, while simultaneously shielding transactions from conventional anti-money-laundering oversight.
Table 2: Rules, Regulations, and Governance Mechanisms Relevant to Dark Web Trafficking
| Instrument of Governance | Scope | Relevance to Dark Web and Governance Gaps |
| Indian Cybercrime and Digital Law Enforcement | ||
| Information Technology Act, 2000[61] | The principal Indian cybercrime statute governing digital offences, electronic data misuse, and related law enforcement powers. | Provides the legal basis for investigating online offences and prosecuting cyber-enabled crime. However, the Act was drafted before dark web markets became prominent and does not explicitly address anonymisation technologies such as Tor or cryptocurrency-based illicit marketplaces. |
| Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre (I4C)[62] | National nodal body coordinating India’s cybercrime response. | Supports intelligence sharing, cyber forensics, and dark web monitoring initiatives. Capacity constraints and jurisdictional coordination challenges remain in the effort to address highly anonymised dark web marketplaces. |
| Indian Narcotics and Precursor Controls | ||
| Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act)[63] | Regulates narcotic and precursor chemical trafficking in India. | Provides the primary legal basis for prosecuting illicit drug trafficking, including online transactions. However, the law focuses primarily on physical trafficking networks and does not specifically address encrypted marketplaces or cryptocurrency-based transactions common on the dark web. |
| NCB[64] | India’s primary enforcement agency for narcotics and precursor chemical trafficking. | Investigates drug trafficking networks and has increasingly engaged with cyber-enabled trafficking cases. Dark web market investigations remain challenging due to cross-border jurisdictional issues and anonymous payment systems. |
| International Narcotics Governance | ||
| Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961)[65] | Foundational global treaty regulating narcotic drugs. | Establishes international control over drug production and distribution. The treaty predates digital marketplaces and therefore does not address online drug sales or dark web distribution channels. |
| Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971)[66] | International framework regulating synthetic psychotropic substances. | Introduces international scheduling and control measures. Like earlier drug treaties, it focuses on physical supply chains and lacks provisions addressing online trafficking through dark web platforms. |
| United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988)[67] | Global treaty addressing illicit drug trafficking and precursor chemicals. | Encourages international cooperation, extradition, and asset seizure. While relevant to transnational dark web trafficking networks, it was designed for traditional trafficking routes and does not explicitly address encrypted digital marketplaces or cryptocurrency payments. |
| United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)[68] | UN agency supporting global drug control and organised crime prevention. | Conducts research and capacity-building on emerging trafficking methods, including dark web markets, though enforcement authority remains with national governments. |
| International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)[69] | Independent monitoring body overseeing implementation of global drug control treaties. | Monitors precursor chemical diversion and global narcotics trends. Its monitoring frameworks increasingly examine online trafficking risks, but enforcement capacity is indirect. |
| Biological and Chemical Weapon Control | ||
| Chemical Weapons Convention Act, 2000 (CWC Act)[70] | Implements India’s obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. | Regulates toxic chemicals and precursor substances. While effective for industrial monitoring, the framework is less suited to detecting small-scale precursor acquisition through anonymous online markets. |
| National Authority for Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC)[71] | India’s administrative authority is responsible for implementing CWC obligations. | Oversees compliance and industrial monitoring. Dark web procurement of small precursor quantities may fall outside traditional industrial oversight mechanisms. |
| Department of Biotechnology (DBT)[72] | Government authority overseeing biotechnology regulation and biosafety governance. | Regulates biotechnology research and biosafety frameworks. However, online dissemination of biological knowledge and potential dual-use materials through digital networks creates emerging oversight challenges. |
| Weapons of Mass Destruction and Export Controls | ||
| Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 2005[73] | Criminalises the proliferation of WMD-related materials and technologies. | Provides a legal basis for prosecuting illicit transfer of chemical and biological materials. Enforcement may be complicated when procurement occurs through encrypted digital marketplaces and cross-border online vendors. |
| Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, and SCOMET List[74] | Governs export and import of sensitive dual-use items. | Controls export of chemicals and biological agents. However, monitoring small-scale purchases through online vendors or dark web intermediaries remains a regulatory challenge. |
| International Obligations and Frameworks | ||
| Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)[75] | Multilateral treaty prohibiting development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. | Provides robust verification and inspection mechanisms for state-level compliance. It does not directly address non-state-actor procurement through dark web supply chains. |
| Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)[76] | Multilateral treaty banning biological weapons. | Requires states to prevent misuse of biological agents. However, the treaty lacks a formal verification regime and does not explicitly address online knowledge dissemination or dark web procurement risks. |
| United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540[77] | Binding obligation requiring states to prevent WMD proliferation to non-state actors. | Encourages domestic controls over materials and technologies. Dark-web-enabled procurement by non-state actors highlights implementation challenges in monitoring digital supply chains. |
| International Cybercrime Governance | ||
| Budapest Convention on Cybercrime [78] | First international treaty harmonising cybercrime legislation and cooperation. | Facilitates digital evidence sharing and joint cybercrime investigations relevant to dark web markets. India’s non-signatory status may limit access to some cooperative mechanisms. |
| United Nations Convention against Cybercrime[79] | Global UN treaty addressing cybercrime cooperation adopted in 2024–2025. | Designed to strengthen international cooperation on cybercrime investigations, including cross-border digital evidence relevant to dark web marketplaces. |
| Transnational Organised Crime | ||
| United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC)[80] | Global treaty addressing organised crime networks and trafficking. | Relevant to dark web trafficking networks that operate transnationally. Provides mechanisms for extradition, asset recovery, and law enforcement cooperation. |
| International Law Enforcement Organisations | ||
| INTERPOL | Global police cooperation network. | Supports intelligence sharing and coordinated investigations targeting cybercrime and dark web trafficking networks. |
| Joint Criminal Opioid and Darknet Enforcement (J-CODE) | International coalition targeting opioid trafficking networks. | Focuses specifically on dark web drug trafficking investigations, cryptocurrency tracing, and vendor identification across jurisdictions. |
Source: Authors’ own, using multiple sources as cited.
Note: The listed governance tools directly address biological and chemical agents, precursor chemicals, and narcotics. Other subsidiary governance tools may overlap these areas but are not included here.
Challenges in Verifying Scale and Authenticity of Biochemical Weapons
Assessing the scope and legitimacy of biochemical-weapons-related activities on the dark web is inherently difficult. A primary challenge is the high probability that many of the listings are scams to deceive buyers or artificially inflate the perceived availability of biochemical material. Additionally, dark web marketplaces are highly transient, with sites frequently being shut down due to legal intervention or renamed to mirror sites, to evade law enforcement and traceability. Sellers also operate under multiple digital identities or within closed networks, further complicating efforts to comprehensively understand the ecosystem.
Some biochemical material listings might not even be genuine, as they may be part of sting operations by law enforcement or intelligence agencies. While cybersecurity monitoring, police investigations, and scholarly research indicate that dark web platforms host information and materials related to biochemical hazards, there remains ambiguity on how these resources are actually used or the extent to which they can be operationalised.
Despite these uncertainties, structural indicators provide sufficient grounds to consider the dark web a relevant factor in biosecurity risk. The convergence of accessible precursor materials, knowledge-sharing networks, and the potential involvement of extremist actors lead to a credible and evolving security concern.
Dark-web-facilitated biochemical misuse can potentially have severe consequences, even if the probability remains relatively low. The likelihood of small-scale incidents or accidental releases due to dark web markets is high. Even minor events can have disproportionate effects on public health, political stability, and larger societal and political concern on biosecurity and safety.[81] The anonymity afforded to users complicates attribution, weakening traditional deterrence mechanisms.
At the same time, excessive security measures risk constraining legitimate biochemical research and pharmaceutical innovation. The regulatory approach needs to be balanced to allow proper use, encourage research, but prevent misuse.
In the Indian context, the main biochemical risk stems from the formulation and international trade of dual-use chemicals rather than domestic dark web demand. Global regulatory bodies, including the INCB, have noted that Indian manufacturers of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine often possess production capacities that exceed domestic requirements. The surplus has, in some cases, been diverted to neighbouring countries such as Myanmar, Thailand, and Malaysia, where it is used to manufacture methamphetamine and other synthetic narcotics.[82] This is further underscored by federal indictments involving Indian companies exporting fentanyl precursor chemicals to the US. From a biosecurity perspective, the risks associated with these substances stem largely from inadequate end-use verification and weak monitoring mechanisms. These challenges are systemic in nature rather than purely arising from proliferation.
The dark web serves as a facilitating template for trafficking dual-use chemicals, exposing broader vulnerabilities in regulatory and monitoring systems. Even in cases involving unverified biological materials, the underlying concern remains their potential misuse by malicious actors. The threat posed by biochemical misuse, although difficult to quantify, can cause widespread panic, economic disruption, and political instability, particularly in fragile or conflict-prone environments.
Recommendations to Mitigate Biochemical Risks on the Dark Web
The growing availability of biochemical materials and associated technical knowledge on the dark web presents a complex security challenge. While international frameworks such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) provide important regulations, these rules were drafted before the digital age. Therefore, they are not fully equipped to counter new forms of trade such as online platforms, encrypted communication, and cryptocurrency-based transactions.
In recent years, India has increasingly recognised the regulatory challenges posed by anonymous digital transactions and virtual currencies, particularly their potential for money laundering and terror financing. Reports of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Virtual Currencies and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance have highlighted the need for coordinated oversight, stronger anti-money-laundering mechanisms, and adaptive regulatory frameworks to address emerging cyber-enabled financial threats within decentralised digital ecosystems.[83] However, the rapid and evolving nature of dark web marketplaces and the transnational character of cybercrime necessitate coordinated and adaptive responses across multiple enforcement agencies.
The following recommendations are proposed for the Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre (I4C), the NCB, and related institutions:
- Strengthen Cyber Forensics and Intelligence Sharing: The I4C and NCB should establish dedicated taskforces to address dark web activities related to biochemical materials. These units can integrate cyber experts, intelligence analysts, and investigative personnel to enhance monitoring and response capabilities. Simultaneously, these organisations must work in collaboration with the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) and Financial Intelligence Unit—India (FIU-India) to develop secure frameworks that will enable timely and protected information sharing between domestic agencies and international partners regarding the trafficking of precursor chemicals and biological materials. Instruments such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime may be leveraged to formalise cross-border cooperation and facilitate access to digital evidence.
- Legal Reforms and Harmonisation: National legislation should be updated to explicitly criminalise the trafficking of biochemical materials through digital platforms, keeping I4C and NCB stakeholders central to the drafting process. Ministries overseeing the implementation of existing biochemical security should ensure that cybercrime provisions are incorporated in the regulatory mandates governing precursor chemicals. These ministries must also harmonise domestic laws with international legal frameworks to ensure consistent recognition and prosecution. This can also be done by forming a dedicated cell under the I4C that addresses issues concerning the dark web. Furthermore, enforcement mechanisms should be aligned with the BWC and CWC while adapting to challenges posed by encryption, dark web platforms, and cryptocurrency use.
- Promote Public–Private Collaboration: Collaboration is essential to develop tools related to dark web surveillance, cryptocurrency tracking, and the identification of dual-use materials. Border Control Forces, I4C, and the NCB can encourage formal partnerships with cybersecurity firms, research institutions, and technology companies to enhance monitoring and analytical capabilities. They must also encourage updating risk-assessment training and standardise procedures to curb such risks. They should also promote academic research to improve risk-assessment methodologies and develop policy and technological solutions that balance security imperatives with civil liberties.
- Balance Privacy and Security: While it is important for the forces to supervise the dark web and ensure that illicit materials do not affect local populations, surveillance and investigative practices must be designed in a manner that respects constitutional protections and individual privacy rights. The NCB and I4C must establish ethical standards, legal oversight, and principles of proportionality for all cyber monitoring activities. Maintaining public trust is essential while addressing the risks associated with biochemical threats in digital environments to ensure that the public does not shift to alternative sources to access information and materials. This will also reduce the burden on the NCB and I4C of monitoring such online traffic.
- Enhance Upstream Controls and Regulatory Oversight: Stronger end-use verification systems, export controls, and monitoring mechanisms should be implemented for industries dealing with dual-use chemicals, particularly substances such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. These upstream controls should be integrated with dark web monitoring and financial intelligence systems. Regular audits and risk assessments of high-exposure sectors are necessary to identify vulnerabilities and mitigate their potential exploitation.
The interaction between decentralised dark web marketplaces, technological expertise, cryptocurrency-based financial systems, and domestic chemical production creates multiple pathways for biochemical risk in India. Addressing this requires a coordinated, technology-enabled, and legally robust framework. Effective implementation of the given measures would strengthen the capacity of agencies such as the I4C and NCB to counter dark-web-enabled biochemical risks while safeguarding legitimate scientific and industrial activity.
Conclusion
The dark web is an emerging dimension in the broader landscape of biochemical security, shaped by rapid technological advancements and fragmented international regulatory systems. Addressing it requires forward-looking and coordinated measures at both the national and global levels. Innovations in cyber forensics, data analytics, and blockchain technologies should be leveraged to enhance detection and enforcement capabilities. At the same time, stronger international cooperation and harmonised legal frameworks are necessary to effectively counter illicit biochemical activities on digital platforms.
However, technological solutions alone are insufficient; strengthening diplomatic engagement, regulatory responsibility, and ethical governance will ensure an appropriate balance between security and privacy. Building sustained partnerships between governments, industry, and academia will be essential in developing a comprehensive and multidimensional response to this evolving threat.
Addressing these risks requires a shift from reactive enforcement—relying on seizures of illicit material that has already crossed Indian borders and may have escaped monitoring or recalling due to supply chain leaks—to an integrated oversight encompassing chemical production, financial monitoring, and coordination among counterterrorism, cybercrime, and biosecurity agencies. In an era of rapid advancements in the life sciences, it is imperative for authorities to upgrade existing regulations to address both existing and potential risks.
Shravishtha Ajaykumar is Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology, Observer Research Foundation.
Soumya Awasthi is Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology. Observer Research Foundation.
The authors acknowledge the use of Scribbr and Elicit to generate sources for material used in this paper, and Grammarly for language refinement.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
Appendix 1
Types of Substances
| Substance Category | Common Forms/Types | Primary Sources | Dark Web Usage | Detection Challenges |
| Fentanyl and Precursor Chemicals |
· Fentanyl pills
· Powder
· NPP
· ANPP
|
· Clandestine labs
· China
· Mexico
· Dark web vendors[84]
|
· Most trafficked
· High volume in dark web markets
|
· Potency variation (0.02–5.1mg per pill)
· Contamination of other drugs
· Lethal in small doses
|
| LSD |
· Blotters
· Stamps
· Liquid
· Tabs
|
· Global supplier is Dr Seuss (Dr Seuss/Tribe Seuss)
· UK resellers (Gunga Din)[85]
|
· Specific dark web markets
· Rating-based vendor systems
|
· Odourless, colourless, tasteless
· Easy to mail
· Postal interception is the primary method of detection
|
| Ketamine |
· Powder
· Liquid
|
· Chemical suppliers
· Dark web vendors
· Clandestine synthesis[86]
|
· Mid-tier trafficking
· Pain management drug diversion
|
· Pharmaceutical-grade variant available
· Can be synthesised from precursors
|
| MDMA/Ecstasy |
· Powder
· Pills
· Crystals
| Clandestine labs (primarily European)[87] | Popular on dark web markets | Purity varies significantly—often mixed with other substances |
| Novel Opioids (Nitazenes) |
· Metonitazene
· Protonitazene
· Isotonitazene
|
· Recent synthesis
· China, UK sources[88]
|
· Emerging threat in 2024–25
· Under-detected
|
· Not yet internationally regulated
· 200x potency of morphine
· Difficult to identify in the field
|
| Precursor Chemicals |
· Dimethyl methylphosphonate (DMMP)
· TMP
· Other organic compounds
|
· Chinese manufacturers
· European chemical suppliers[89]
| Critical for clandestine drug manufacturing |
· Diverted from legitimate industrial/pharmaceutical supply chains
· Difficult to trace end use
|
| Illicit Pharmaceuticals |
· Medicines for erectile dysfunction
· Nervous system agents
· Anabolic steroids
· Anti-diabetic drugs
· Dermatological medicines
|
· Counterfeit manufacturing
· Diverted from legitimate supply[90]
| Large-scale dark web pharmaceutical markets |
· Contamination with active drugs or toxic substances
· Difficulty distinguishing genuine from counterfeit
|
| Synthetic Drugs (General) |
· Methamphetamine
· Cocaine variants
· Designer drugs
|
· Clandestine labs
· Mexican cartels
· Dark web manufacturers[91]
| Sustained high-volume trafficking |
· Composition variation
· Novel synthesis methods to evade precursor controls
|
Source: Authors’ own, using multiple open sources as cited.
Appendix 2
Digital Assets and Cryptocurrencies
| Operation (Year) | Country (ies) | Cryptocurrency Seized | Wallet Type | Conversion Value (US$/INR) | Platform Details | Investigation Method |
| Operation SpecTor (2025) | Europol—nine countries (US, Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands + four unnamed countries)[92] | Over US$53 million[93] | Multiple dark web wallets | US$53M | Dark web marketplace wallets |
Blockchain analysis
Marketplace seizure
|
| Ketamelon Operation (July 2025) | India | 70 lakh USDT (~US$84K)[94] | Hardware wallet + Binance custodial | INR 70 lakh (~US$84K) | Hardware wallet + Binance; other custodial wallets identified |
Bootable KITES OS forensics
Wallet recovery
|
| Zambada Cartel (2023) | India | Not specified cryptocurrency details | Assumed dark web wallets | INR 51.38 lakh cash (~US$62K US$)[95] | Direct seizure | Physical cash seizure at location |
| Pangea XVII (2024–25) | 90 countries (Interpol) | Component of US$65M total | US$65M in illicit pharmaceuticals value | US$65M total[96] | Online marketplace payment systems | Website shutdown (13K criminal-linked sites) |
| Ongoing Dark Web Operations | Millions in digital assets | Bitcoin, Monero, USDT, other altcoins | Millions yearly | Dark web markets (defunct: Monopoly, others) | Law enforcement blockchain-tracking tools | |
| Pattern Analysis | Increasing trend | Hardware wallets, mixing services, privacy coins | Growing sophistication | Monero adoption for anonymity; Bitcoin traceability advantage | Cooperation from international crypto exchanges |
Source: Authors’ own, using multiple open sources as cited.
Endnotes
[a] The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons and has 189 States Parties and four Signatory States.
[b] The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction has 193 States Parties.
[c] Anthrax, caused by the bacterium Bacillus anthracis, is known for its durable spores and historical use in bioterrorism, particularly during the 2001 attacks in the US.
[d] Chemical substances used in labs to form compounds.
[e] Informal value transfer systems (IVTS) refer to money transfer mechanisms operating outside formal banking channels, enabling the transfer of value through trusted intermediaries without physical or electronic movement of funds through regulated financial institutions. This can be through the hawala system.
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[89] Kevin Kinnee, “Illicit Drug Precursor Shipments From China: A Growing Concern,” Kpler, August 21, 2024, https://www.kpler.com/blog/illicit-drug-precursor-shipments-from-china-a-growing-concern.
[90] “Trade In Counterfeit Pharmaceutical Products,” OECD (2020), https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2020/03/trade-in-counterfeit-pharmaceutical-products_9404e892/a7c7e054-en.pdf.
[91], “Cartels,” United States Drug Enforcement Administration, https://www.dea.gov/cartels.
[92] “288 Dark Web Vendors Arrested in Major Marketplace Seizure.”
[93] “288 Dark Web Vendors Arrested in Major Marketplace Seizure.”
[94] “NCB Busts Top Darknet Drug Vendor ‘Ketamelon’ In Operation MELON.”
[95] “NCB Busts Top Darknet Drug Vendor ‘Ketamelon’ In Operation MELON.”
[96] “Operation Pangea XVII Nets $65 Million In Unapproved And Counterfeit Medicines,” Partnership for Safe Medicines, July 1, 2025. https://www.safemedicines.org/2025/06/june-30-2025.html.
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Introduction
The rapid development of encrypted digital networks has raised new issues in global biochemical security. While the dark web is not a primary marketplace for chemical and biological warfare agents, it is a critical enabler for access to dual-use precursor chemicals, equipment, and research materials through anonymous and decentralised networks.
The dark web refers to an invisible section of the internet that relies on encryption and anonymity to conceal the identities and locations of its users. In contrast to the surface web, which can be accessed through standard browsers, dark web services require specialised networks such as Tor (“The Onion Router”).[1] Tor reroutes communication through multiple nodes, making user activity difficult to track, thus increasing the scope of anonymity. Originally developed by researchers with support from institutions like the United States (US) Naval Research Laboratory, Tor was intended to enable secure communication for journalists, activists, and government officials operating in high-risk environments.[2] Over time, however, this infrastructure has evolved into a repository for anonymous online marketplaces that facilitate a range of illicit economic activities.
Among the most prominent of these marketplaces was the ‘Silk Road,’ which operated between 2011 to 2013 and enabled users to purchase narcotics using Bitcoin.[3] Its eventual shutdown by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) demonstrated the scale of such operations—over US$3 million in transactional holdings was seized—and the capacity of law enforcement to intervene.[4] The resilience of other platforms, such as AlphaBay and Hansa Market, through their better security features and broader offerings, demonstrates the adaptability of dark web trade. Their closure in 2017 under ‘Operation Bayonet,’ led by the Dutch National Police, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), and the FBI, revealed marketplaces trading over 350,000 illicit commodities, including opioids and malware, as well as providing money-laundering services. Only their administrators were placed under arrest— two in Germany and one in Thailand.[5] The lack of information around the buyers of these illicit materials highlights the anonymity these platforms provide and why they use difficult-to-trace currency. Relying on anonymity and trust between vendors and buyers, they have created a structurally flexible marketplace that can evade detection.
Despite extensive research on narcotics trafficking and cybercrime, the implications of the dark web as a platform for biochemical security threats remain comparatively underexplored. However, the availability of narcotics and chemical precursors is clear evidence of the foundational infrastructure they provide for the illicit trade and transfer of dangerous biological agents and chemical agents.
Biochemical threats encompass chemical weapons such as sarin; toxic industrial chemicals including chlorine; biological agents like anthrax; and delivery systems like drones or explosives, capable of producing large-scale public health and national security consequences. International frameworks that preceded the dark web, such as the Biological Weapons Convention[a] and the Chemical Weapons Convention,[b] regulate the development, stockpiling, and transfer of such materials.[6] However, enforcement mechanisms face increasing challenges in an environment where encrypted digital networks enable decentralised and concealed procurement pathways.
Current evidence does not record the dark web being widely used for direct acquisition of chemical or biological weapons systems. Instead, its significance lies in the growing trade of dual-use precursor chemicals, laboratory equipment, and research compounds on it. These materials, while legitimate in many contexts, can be repurposed for illicit experimentation or small-scale synthesis. Studies by organisations such as the RAND Corporation and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction indicate that dark web marketplaces are actively used to procure precursor compounds for synthetic opioids and stimulants,[7] a shift from direct weaponisation to enabling components within broader illicit production chains.
This issue has high policy relevance in the Indian context. As one of the world’s largest producers of pharmaceuticals and industrial chemicals, India plays a prominent role in global supply chains for active pharmaceutical ingredients and related products. Regulatory oversight is exercised through institutions such as the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) and the Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN).[8] However, the rapid expansion of digital connectivity, e-commerce platforms, and encrypted financial systems has introduced new vulnerabilities. These law enforcement agencies have already documented instances of narcotics networks in India leveraging dark web platforms to procure synthetic drugs (see Table 1).
This convergence of encrypted marketplaces, large-scale chemical production, and anonymous financial systems creates a complex and evolving policy challenge. Dark web platforms facilitate clandestine communication, cross-border procurement, and fragmented supply chains that operate beyond the purview of traditional monitoring frameworks. As a result, they function as structural enablers that can accelerate the movement of hazardous materials by exploiting regulatory gaps and providing technological anonymity. India is at a critical juncture where it needs to overcome gaps in regulatory processes that have permitted previous infiltrations and improve upon tracking of illicit biochemical materials that can be traded over the dark web.
Dark Web Activity in India and Globally
Dark web markets, also referred to as cryptomarkets, are online black markets that operate on Tor and another privacy-focused network, the Invisible Internet Project (I2P).[9] Structurally, these platforms mirror legitimate e-commerce websites by offering product listings, vendor profiles, customer reviews, and dispute resolution mechanisms—features that foster trust among anonymous users and contribute to the persistence of illicit trade despite repeated law enforcement crackdowns.
The resilience of dark web markets comes from four technological attributes: anonymity services, encrypted communication channels, decentralised hosting infrastructure, and cryptocurrency-based payment systems. Since these features are not based on the goods being traded, the same platforms can also support transactions involving weapons components, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, and dual-use chemical products. Enforcement actions targeting individual marketplaces rarely disrupt the broader ecosystem as participants migrate to alternative platforms, adopt new digital identities, and continue operations in a fragmented but adaptive network.[10]
From a biosecurity perspective, the primary threat lies in the facilitation of transactions due to the protected, anonymity-forward environment. The dark web enables individuals to connect with international suppliers, access technical expertise to carry out illegal activities, and procure laboratory materials with minimal oversight. This weakens traditional regulatory mechanisms that rely on traceability of transactions and jurisdictional control, thereby increasing the risk of illicit experimentation involving chemical precursor material and specialised equipment.
Evidence from India indicates that dark-web-related narcotics trafficking remains limited and measurable. The NCB reported approximately 92 cases involving cryptocurrency-linked dark web transactions out of a total of 1,025 narcotics trade cases between January 2020 and April 2024.[11] This represents a small proportion of overall narcotics cases in India and an even smaller share of global dark web activity, which is concentrated in Europe and North America.[12] However, it demonstrates the presence of such networks within the Indian context.
The nature of these cases reveals some clear patterns: most involve synthetic drugs and diverted pharmaceutical products, such as lysergic acid diethylamide (f), 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), ketamine, and prescription opioids.[13] Investigations have uncovered cross-border procurement pipelines where buyers engage vendors through encrypted platforms and receive shipments of illegal products through postal and courier services. For example, law enforcement operations in Bengaluru cracked down on a pan-Indian network that imported LSD and MDMA from European dark web vendors using wallets like Monero and USDT that employ cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum, Tron, and Bitcoin.[14] Subsequent arrests from Mumbai and Gujarat further illustrate the integration of dark web markets with traditional supply chains, including attempts to import large quantities of narcotics through international logistics channels linked to dark web vendors. Such cases demonstrate how digital anonymity intersects with physical freight distribution systems, creating hybrid networks that are difficult to monitor and regulate.[15]
Dark web markets generate substantial revenues globally, with narcotics trade alone estimated at approximately US$470 million in 2022, growing to over US$2 billion in 2025.[16],[17] The commonly traded drugs include cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, and MDMA. What began with trading based on cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin moved to Monero when Bitcoin announced its traceability in 2017. Most transactions now rely on other untraceable wallets and currencies.[18]
India’s position is relatively peripheral in terms of consumption, with an estimated 103,866 daily Tor users,[19] but this obscures a strong structural risk. Its chemical and pharmaceutical industry, valued at approximately US$220 billion in 2023 and projected to reach US$300–450 billion by 2028–2030, produces over 80,000 products.[20] This industrial base positions India as a critical supplier of chemical precursors and pharmaceutical materials in global supply chains. The intersection of this high production capacity with dark-web-enabled procurement networks raises concerns regarding the tracking and diversion of dual-use substances.
Beyond narcotics, indicators of broader cybercrime activity highlight additional vulnerabilities in India. The presence of stolen biometric and individual data on dark web forums that can be used to extract health records, such as data extracted from the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), provide potential for misuse of sensitive scientific information.[21] Such data may be sold over the dark web, posing privacy risks for individuals whose biological and biometric data has been used by the ICMR, or even for the general population, by allowing malicious actors to exploit such data beyond their originally intended purposes, creating risks of unauthorised secondary research, profiling, and other uses involving sensitive biological information.[22],[23] The World Health Organization (WHO) has repeatedly warned that unauthorised access, theft, and misuse of biological data can exacerbate biosecurity threats, particularly when actors exploit gaps in existing digital safeguards, upgrading its own recommendations for biosafety standards for patient records as well.[24]
The absence of publicly confirmed cases in India involving direct trade of advanced chemical or biological weapons should be interpreted with caution. The heavily encrypted, transnational nature of dark web activity complicates detection, attribution, and timely disclosure. Investigations often span multiple jurisdictions and can take years, while marketplaces themselves are highly volatile, frequently changing their names and operational structures. These factors create operational challenges for law enforcement, suggesting that observable cases probably represent only a fraction of actual activity.
Table 1: Incidents and Seizures
| Case | Enforcement Outcomes (Arrests and Seizures) | Key Details |
| Operation DisrupTor (September 2020, Europe and the US)[25] |
· 179 arrests
· 500 kg of multiple drugs seized
· 63 firearms confiscated
· Digital assets worth US$6.5 million in cash and virtual currencies
| · Huge dark web marketplace crackdown |
| The Zambada Cartel (2023, National Capital Region, India)[26] |
· 22 arrests
· 29,013 LSD blots and 472 g MDMA seized
· INR 51.38 lakh cash recovered
|
· Largest dark web LSD cartel at the time
· Five-star vendor network
· Kingpins placed in judicial custody
|
| Tenzin Orgil Case (May 2024, California, US)[27] |
· One arrest
· Methamphetamine recipe and MDMA precursor chemicals seized
· Digital assets not specified
|
· Dark web vendor ‘iBULK,’ a clandestine lab operator sourcing Chinese precursor chemicals
· Sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment
|
|
Operation Pangea XVII
(2024–2025, across 90 countries)[28]
|
· 769 arrests
· 50.4 million doses of illicit pharmaceuticals seized
· US$65 million in value
|
· Largest coordinated operation
· 123 criminal groups dismantled
· Over 13,000 websites/pages shut down
|
|
Operation SpecTor
(February 2025, international)[29]
|
· 288 arrests
· 850 kg of drugs seized, including 64 kg of fentanyl
· Over US$53.4 million seized
|
· Most arrests in Joint Criminal Opioid Dark Web Enforcement (J-CODE) history
· Dark web marketplace seizure
|
| Dark web Vendor Case (September 2025, Canada)[30] |
· Seven arrests
· 75 kg of various narcotics and 10,000 prescription and non-prescription pills seized
| · One of the largest multi-agency investigations of dark web drug-trafficking operations[31] |
|
Operation Melon— Ketamelon bust
(July 2025, Kochi, India)[32]
|
· Two arrests
· 1,127 LSD blots and 131.66 g ketamine seized
· INR 70 lakh in cryptocurrency and INR 35.12 lakh street value
|
· India’s Level 4 dark web vendor
· ~600 shipments in 14 months
· UK link (‘Gunga Din’)
· Tied to Dr Seuss global network
|
|
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Fentanyl Seizures
(2024, US)[33]
|
· Multiple arrests
· 60 million pills and 8000 lbs of fentanyl powder seized[34]
|
· Indicates scale of fentanyl crisis
· Seizures continued into 2025 at increasing levels
|
|
DEA Seizures
(January–April 2025, US)[35]
|
· Multiple arrests
· 22.2 million fentanyl pills and over 3,100 pounds of powder seized
|
· Year-to-date 2025 figures
· Widespread fentanyl contamination
|
|
Nitazene and Precursor Seizures
(September 2025, US airports and Mexico)[36]
Part of the Operation Lionfish-Mayag III (30 June–13 July 2025)
|
· Multiple interceptions coordinated by INTERPOL across 18 countries in Asia and North America
· 190,000 fentanyl tablets and 1.7 tonnes of methamphetamine seized[37]
· Digital value not specified
|
· Emerging synthetic opioid threat (Nitazene’s potency is up to 200× that of morphine)
· Shipments linked to the UK and China
· Difficult detection
|
| Global dark web synthetic drug trade (2020–2025, South and Southeast Asia, Mekong)[38] |
· Multiple operations
· Precursor chemicals, synthetic drugs, and pharmaceuticals seized
· Millions in digital assets
|
· Growth of novel precursors to evade detection
· Reliance on cryptocurrency
· Expansion of transnational dark-web-enabled supply chains
|
Source: Authors’ own, collected from multiple open sources.
Chemical and Biological Agents on the Dark Web
There is limited publicly available data regarding the sale of weapon-grade chemical and biological agents on dark web marketplaces. This reflects the severe legal consequences associated with such activities and the inherently clandestine nature of the actors involved. Much of the existing research focuses on marketplace structures, user behaviour, and trade in related or precursor materials rather than confirmed transactions involving fully weaponised agents.
Early research by Nicolas Christin (2013) demonstrated that dark web markets function as sophisticated trading platforms with similar organisational features as legitimate e-commerce sites. His research revealed the online Silk Road as being predominantly used for narcotics trade and identified thousands of listings for controlled substances, along with smaller quantities of chemical compounds and laboratory equipment.[39] His findings illustrated the capacity of dark web platforms to facilitate anonymous cross-border transactions involving a diverse range of goods, including those relevant to chemical and biological research.
Subsequent studies by Judith Aldridge, Masarah Paquet-Clouston, and David Décary-Hétu (2016) further examined the organisational dynamics of cryptomarkets.[40] Their work highlights how vendors frequently offer pharmaceutical products, research chemicals, and precursor substances in addition to narcotics on the dark web.[41] Reputation systems, escrow services, and user feedback mechanisms play a critical role in sustaining trust within these anonymous environments, thereby enabling continued trade.
Open-source intelligence has also identified isolated instances involving biochemical agents on the dark web, with intent to purchase or develop. For example, ricin, a toxin derived from castor beans, has appeared in dark-web-related investigations. In a 2014 US undercover operation, a suspect expressed their intent to purchase ricin and claimed to have prospective buyers. While such cases demonstrate interest and intent, they do not necessarily confirm successful acquisition or the authenticity of the substances involved.[42]
Similarly, references to anthrax[c] have periodically surfaced on underground forums.[43] However, experts warn that many dark web listings are unreliable, as vendors may misrepresent products to attract buyers.[44] Analysts such as Molly J. Hall and others emphasise the significant psychological and political impact of even small-scale biological incidents.[45] While the reporting of biological agents on the dark web may be exaggerated, even a small amount and interest in the same from buyers represents a significant social and political concern.
More substantiated concerns have emerged in cases involving attempted acquisitions of biological toxins and chemical precursors. For instance, a teenager in the UK attempted to obtain the deadly toxin abrin through a dark web platform, but the transaction was intercepted by authorities.[46] Among chemicals, organophosphate compounds have been identified in online listings. While these substances have legitimate industrial and agricultural uses, they are chemically related to nerve agents such as sarin and VX. Analysts such as Jean-Pascal Zanders (1999) argue that proliferation risks are more closely linked to the movement of such precursor chemicals than to fully developed agents.[47]
Empirical research also highlights the prevalence of online trade in synthetic drug precursors. Bryce Pardo’s work (2019) on transitioning markets as a platform for synthetic opioids demonstrates how vendors advertise these chemicals using technical specifications and ship them through conventional logistics networks, often facilitated by cryptocurrency payments.[48] Although primarily linked to narcotics production, these practices highlight the broader issue of dual-use chemicals circulating through poorly regulated online ecosystems.[49]
The adaptability of dark web markets was particularly evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, when vendors included counterfeit vaccines, vaccination certificates, and unlicenced pharmaceutical products among their wares.[50] This illustrated the capacity of these platforms to integrate biomedical goods into existing illicit trade networks in response to changing demand.[51]
Taken together, the available research suggests that the principal biosecurity concern is not the widespread sale of weaponised agents, but the circulation of dual-use chemicals, laboratory reagents,[d] and specialised materials through anonymised procurement channels.[52] These channels, supported by global logistics networks and digital financial infrastructures, create strong barriers to monitoring and regulation.
The absence of verified large-scale transactions involving chemical or biological weapons, therefore, should not be interpreted as an absence of risk. Instead, it reflects the limitations of detection and attribution within encrypted transnational environments. The anonymity and decentralisation of dark web markets continue to pose challenges for biosecurity governance by enabling the discreet movement of hazardous materials and knowledge across borders.
Instructional Content on the Dark Web
Apart from facilitating the trade of physical commodities, anonymised networks provide means of sharing technical information on chemistry, biotechnology, and hazardous materials. Hidden services accessible through networks like Tor grant users access to encrypted forums, discussion boards, and document-sharing sites where they can exchange manuals, experimental descriptions, and simplified guides related to chemical and biological material, as well as information on toxin extraction and chemical synthesis.[53] Access to these networks is often invite-only, allowing a limited number of users.
Researchers studying extremist and underground digital ecosystems have noted that such environments create hubs for amateur chemists, technically inclined hobbyists, and politically radicalised individuals to converge. Maura Conway (2019) notes that encrypted platforms enable the transmission of operational information and ideological messaging.[54] Gregory D. Koblentz (2020) argues that digital communication technologies have enhanced access to knowledge concerning chemical and biological hazards by removing traditional barriers to expertise.[55]
Parallel research into the so-called ‘Do It Yourself (DIY) biology’ movement reveals how increased access to scientific knowledge can lead to security concerns. Kathleen Vogel (2012) points out that the reinterpretation of scientific knowledge in informal contexts may lead individuals to experiment with biological materials outside institutional regulatory oversight,[56] which can lead to unsafe practices, accidental exposure, and contamination risk.
The transmission of procedural information in underground forums relies on scientific literature, historical technical manuals, and open-access academic publications. In many cases, users extract elements from legitimate scientific research and repackage them into simplified, step-by-step instructions, omitting ethical guidelines, biosafety protocols, and institutional oversight mechanisms that are integral to formal scientific practice. As a result, while the information becomes more accessible to non-expert audiences, the underlying procedures may remain complex and require specialised knowledge.
Experts on terrorism and unconventional weapons have also identified attempts by extremist actors to acquire technical information related to hazardous materials. Adam Dolnik (2006) observes that such organisations frequently look for instructional content concerning chemical and biological agents on online forums and digital archives.[57] This may include translated scientific texts, chemical formulations, and discussions related to rudimentary delivery mechanisms.
While discussions within anonymised online forums may sometimes extend to methods for disseminating hazardous substances, they are unlikely to be readily operationalised due to the expertise required to do so. However, the collaborative nature of online communities allows users to exchange ideas, critique experimental approaches, and incrementally refine technical concepts.
These knowledge-sharing networks challenge the assumption that limited technical expertise would act as a barrier to the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The exchange of technical information in anonymised digital spaces carries a latent security risk as the increasing availability of scientific knowledge may encourage unsafe experimentation and gradually lower the barrier for amateurs to experiment with hazardous substances. Furthermore, the spread of technical knowledge in digitally mediated environments may outpace regulatory adaptation, allowing diffusion of potentially dangerous expertise before policymakers can respond. Similar developments can be seen in other digitally enabled threat environments where online gaming platforms and encrypted chatrooms have been employed for radicalisation, recruitment, and dissemination of extreme content. Similarly, anonymous digital environments have been leveraged for terror financing.[58]
Tacit knowledge is a key concept in biosecurity research that helps explain this changing dynamic of removing barriers to knowledge and access in the development of chemical and biological weapons. It refers to skills and understanding acquired through hands-on laboratory experience and iterative experimentation, something that cannot be conveyed through written instructions or manuals. Sharing procedural guidance and practical tips through anonymised forums does not diminish the importance of tacit knowledge, but it can reduce some of the barriers to acquiring such expertise.
The Dark Web’s Financial Pipeline
The financial layer is crucial to ensure the resilience of dark web markets, and cryptocurrency serves as its backbone. Transactions are typically conducted through escrow services provided by dark web marketplaces. Cryptocurrencies were initially adopted across dark web markets due to their ability to allow some anonymity to buyers. However, dark web vendors and buyers are now increasingly opting for completely untraceable and privacy-focused cryptocurrencies, such as Monero, a wallet-linked cryptocurrency that does not allow viewing of transaction histories or balance information.
In practice, the flow of money on the dark web is not limited to a single cryptocurrency. For instance, the ‘Operation Melon’ narcotics case (see Table 1) demonstrates the deployment of sophisticated money-laundering practices, including storing funds in stablecoins like USDT (Tether) and exchanging them on international platforms. This type of hybrid financial system not only complicates tracing but undermines the efficacy of anti-money-laundering frameworks. In some countries, money laundering is done by ‘cashing out’ cryptocurrencies using one-time payment identifiers, through Unified Payment Interface (UPI) systems, and hawala networks. In India, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) found instances where money was laundered through payment gateways, and digital or cryptocurrencies.[59]
Profits generated from dark web trafficking are increasingly being converted into cryptocurrencies, which often fall outside the scope of conventional anti-money-laundering systems. Law enforcement agencies have identified several cryptocurrency wallets associated with illegal marketplaces, highlighting the scale of such financial activity.
In certain regions, including South Asia, informal value transfer systems[e] are used to convert cryptocurrency into fiat currency, compounding challenges for law enforcement. For instance, studies by the Indian Enforcement Directorate (ED) have identified cases where Bitcoin transactions, carried out on dark web markets, were exploited by narcotics smugglers who used hawala channels to convert the cryptocurrency into cash, thereby evading banking channels and anti-money-laundering regulations.[60] From a biosecurity perspective, the anonymity of this financial system lowers barriers to acquiring controlled materials across international borders, while simultaneously shielding transactions from conventional anti-money-laundering oversight.
Table 2: Rules, Regulations, and Governance Mechanisms Relevant to Dark Web Trafficking
| Instrument of Governance | Scope | Relevance to Dark Web and Governance Gaps |
| Indian Cybercrime and Digital Law Enforcement | ||
| Information Technology Act, 2000[61] | The principal Indian cybercrime statute governing digital offences, electronic data misuse, and related law enforcement powers. | Provides the legal basis for investigating online offences and prosecuting cyber-enabled crime. However, the Act was drafted before dark web markets became prominent and does not explicitly address anonymisation technologies such as Tor or cryptocurrency-based illicit marketplaces. |
| Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre (I4C)[62] | National nodal body coordinating India’s cybercrime response. | Supports intelligence sharing, cyber forensics, and dark web monitoring initiatives. Capacity constraints and jurisdictional coordination challenges remain in the effort to address highly anonymised dark web marketplaces. |
| Indian Narcotics and Precursor Controls | ||
| Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act)[63] | Regulates narcotic and precursor chemical trafficking in India. | Provides the primary legal basis for prosecuting illicit drug trafficking, including online transactions. However, the law focuses primarily on physical trafficking networks and does not specifically address encrypted marketplaces or cryptocurrency-based transactions common on the dark web. |
| NCB[64] | India’s primary enforcement agency for narcotics and precursor chemical trafficking. | Investigates drug trafficking networks and has increasingly engaged with cyber-enabled trafficking cases. Dark web market investigations remain challenging due to cross-border jurisdictional issues and anonymous payment systems. |
| International Narcotics Governance | ||
| Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961)[65] | Foundational global treaty regulating narcotic drugs. | Establishes international control over drug production and distribution. The treaty predates digital marketplaces and therefore does not address online drug sales or dark web distribution channels. |
| Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971)[66] | International framework regulating synthetic psychotropic substances. | Introduces international scheduling and control measures. Like earlier drug treaties, it focuses on physical supply chains and lacks provisions addressing online trafficking through dark web platforms. |
| United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988)[67] | Global treaty addressing illicit drug trafficking and precursor chemicals. | Encourages international cooperation, extradition, and asset seizure. While relevant to transnational dark web trafficking networks, it was designed for traditional trafficking routes and does not explicitly address encrypted digital marketplaces or cryptocurrency payments. |
| United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)[68] | UN agency supporting global drug control and organised crime prevention. | Conducts research and capacity-building on emerging trafficking methods, including dark web markets, though enforcement authority remains with national governments. |
| International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)[69] | Independent monitoring body overseeing implementation of global drug control treaties. | Monitors precursor chemical diversion and global narcotics trends. Its monitoring frameworks increasingly examine online trafficking risks, but enforcement capacity is indirect. |
| Biological and Chemical Weapon Control | ||
| Chemical Weapons Convention Act, 2000 (CWC Act)[70] | Implements India’s obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. | Regulates toxic chemicals and precursor substances. While effective for industrial monitoring, the framework is less suited to detecting small-scale precursor acquisition through anonymous online markets. |
| National Authority for Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC)[71] | India’s administrative authority is responsible for implementing CWC obligations. | Oversees compliance and industrial monitoring. Dark web procurement of small precursor quantities may fall outside traditional industrial oversight mechanisms. |
| Department of Biotechnology (DBT)[72] | Government authority overseeing biotechnology regulation and biosafety governance. | Regulates biotechnology research and biosafety frameworks. However, online dissemination of biological knowledge and potential dual-use materials through digital networks creates emerging oversight challenges. |
| Weapons of Mass Destruction and Export Controls | ||
| Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 2005[73] | Criminalises the proliferation of WMD-related materials and technologies. | Provides a legal basis for prosecuting illicit transfer of chemical and biological materials. Enforcement may be complicated when procurement occurs through encrypted digital marketplaces and cross-border online vendors. |
| Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, and SCOMET List[74] | Governs export and import of sensitive dual-use items. | Controls export of chemicals and biological agents. However, monitoring small-scale purchases through online vendors or dark web intermediaries remains a regulatory challenge. |
| International Obligations and Frameworks | ||
| Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)[75] | Multilateral treaty prohibiting development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. | Provides robust verification and inspection mechanisms for state-level compliance. It does not directly address non-state-actor procurement through dark web supply chains. |
| Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)[76] | Multilateral treaty banning biological weapons. | Requires states to prevent misuse of biological agents. However, the treaty lacks a formal verification regime and does not explicitly address online knowledge dissemination or dark web procurement risks. |
| United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540[77] | Binding obligation requiring states to prevent WMD proliferation to non-state actors. | Encourages domestic controls over materials and technologies. Dark-web-enabled procurement by non-state actors highlights implementation challenges in monitoring digital supply chains. |
| International Cybercrime Governance | ||
| Budapest Convention on Cybercrime [78] | First international treaty harmonising cybercrime legislation and cooperation. | Facilitates digital evidence sharing and joint cybercrime investigations relevant to dark web markets. India’s non-signatory status may limit access to some cooperative mechanisms. |
| United Nations Convention against Cybercrime[79] | Global UN treaty addressing cybercrime cooperation adopted in 2024–2025. | Designed to strengthen international cooperation on cybercrime investigations, including cross-border digital evidence relevant to dark web marketplaces. |
| Transnational Organised Crime | ||
| United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC)[80] | Global treaty addressing organised crime networks and trafficking. | Relevant to dark web trafficking networks that operate transnationally. Provides mechanisms for extradition, asset recovery, and law enforcement cooperation. |
| International Law Enforcement Organisations | ||
| INTERPOL | Global police cooperation network. | Supports intelligence sharing and coordinated investigations targeting cybercrime and dark web trafficking networks. |
| Joint Criminal Opioid and Darknet Enforcement (J-CODE) | International coalition targeting opioid trafficking networks. | Focuses specifically on dark web drug trafficking investigations, cryptocurrency tracing, and vendor identification across jurisdictions. |
Source: Authors’ own, using multiple sources as cited.
Note: The listed governance tools directly address biological and chemical agents, precursor chemicals, and narcotics. Other subsidiary governance tools may overlap these areas but are not included here.
Challenges in Verifying Scale and Authenticity of Biochemical Weapons
Assessing the scope and legitimacy of biochemical-weapons-related activities on the dark web is inherently difficult. A primary challenge is the high probability that many of the listings are scams to deceive buyers or artificially inflate the perceived availability of biochemical material. Additionally, dark web marketplaces are highly transient, with sites frequently being shut down due to legal intervention or renamed to mirror sites, to evade law enforcement and traceability. Sellers also operate under multiple digital identities or within closed networks, further complicating efforts to comprehensively understand the ecosystem.
Some biochemical material listings might not even be genuine, as they may be part of sting operations by law enforcement or intelligence agencies. While cybersecurity monitoring, police investigations, and scholarly research indicate that dark web platforms host information and materials related to biochemical hazards, there remains ambiguity on how these resources are actually used or the extent to which they can be operationalised.
Despite these uncertainties, structural indicators provide sufficient grounds to consider the dark web a relevant factor in biosecurity risk. The convergence of accessible precursor materials, knowledge-sharing networks, and the potential involvement of extremist actors lead to a credible and evolving security concern.
Dark-web-facilitated biochemical misuse can potentially have severe consequences, even if the probability remains relatively low. The likelihood of small-scale incidents or accidental releases due to dark web markets is high. Even minor events can have disproportionate effects on public health, political stability, and larger societal and political concern on biosecurity and safety.[81] The anonymity afforded to users complicates attribution, weakening traditional deterrence mechanisms.
At the same time, excessive security measures risk constraining legitimate biochemical research and pharmaceutical innovation. The regulatory approach needs to be balanced to allow proper use, encourage research, but prevent misuse.
In the Indian context, the main biochemical risk stems from the formulation and international trade of dual-use chemicals rather than domestic dark web demand. Global regulatory bodies, including the INCB, have noted that Indian manufacturers of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine often possess production capacities that exceed domestic requirements. The surplus has, in some cases, been diverted to neighbouring countries such as Myanmar, Thailand, and Malaysia, where it is used to manufacture methamphetamine and other synthetic narcotics.[82] This is further underscored by federal indictments involving Indian companies exporting fentanyl precursor chemicals to the US. From a biosecurity perspective, the risks associated with these substances stem largely from inadequate end-use verification and weak monitoring mechanisms. These challenges are systemic in nature rather than purely arising from proliferation.
The dark web serves as a facilitating template for trafficking dual-use chemicals, exposing broader vulnerabilities in regulatory and monitoring systems. Even in cases involving unverified biological materials, the underlying concern remains their potential misuse by malicious actors. The threat posed by biochemical misuse, although difficult to quantify, can cause widespread panic, economic disruption, and political instability, particularly in fragile or conflict-prone environments.
Recommendations to Mitigate Biochemical Risks on the Dark Web
The growing availability of biochemical materials and associated technical knowledge on the dark web presents a complex security challenge. While international frameworks such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) provide important regulations, these rules were drafted before the digital age. Therefore, they are not fully equipped to counter new forms of trade such as online platforms, encrypted communication, and cryptocurrency-based transactions.
In recent years, India has increasingly recognised the regulatory challenges posed by anonymous digital transactions and virtual currencies, particularly their potential for money laundering and terror financing. Reports of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Virtual Currencies and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance have highlighted the need for coordinated oversight, stronger anti-money-laundering mechanisms, and adaptive regulatory frameworks to address emerging cyber-enabled financial threats within decentralised digital ecosystems.[83] However, the rapid and evolving nature of dark web marketplaces and the transnational character of cybercrime necessitate coordinated and adaptive responses across multiple enforcement agencies.
The following recommendations are proposed for the Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre (I4C), the NCB, and related institutions:
- Strengthen Cyber Forensics and Intelligence Sharing: The I4C and NCB should establish dedicated taskforces to address dark web activities related to biochemical materials. These units can integrate cyber experts, intelligence analysts, and investigative personnel to enhance monitoring and response capabilities. Simultaneously, these organisations must work in collaboration with the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) and Financial Intelligence Unit—India (FIU-India) to develop secure frameworks that will enable timely and protected information sharing between domestic agencies and international partners regarding the trafficking of precursor chemicals and biological materials. Instruments such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime may be leveraged to formalise cross-border cooperation and facilitate access to digital evidence.
- Legal Reforms and Harmonisation: National legislation should be updated to explicitly criminalise the trafficking of biochemical materials through digital platforms, keeping I4C and NCB stakeholders central to the drafting process. Ministries overseeing the implementation of existing biochemical security should ensure that cybercrime provisions are incorporated in the regulatory mandates governing precursor chemicals. These ministries must also harmonise domestic laws with international legal frameworks to ensure consistent recognition and prosecution. This can also be done by forming a dedicated cell under the I4C that addresses issues concerning the dark web. Furthermore, enforcement mechanisms should be aligned with the BWC and CWC while adapting to challenges posed by encryption, dark web platforms, and cryptocurrency use.
- Promote Public–Private Collaboration: Collaboration is essential to develop tools related to dark web surveillance, cryptocurrency tracking, and the identification of dual-use materials. Border Control Forces, I4C, and the NCB can encourage formal partnerships with cybersecurity firms, research institutions, and technology companies to enhance monitoring and analytical capabilities. They must also encourage updating risk-assessment training and standardise procedures to curb such risks. They should also promote academic research to improve risk-assessment methodologies and develop policy and technological solutions that balance security imperatives with civil liberties.
- Balance Privacy and Security: While it is important for the forces to supervise the dark web and ensure that illicit materials do not affect local populations, surveillance and investigative practices must be designed in a manner that respects constitutional protections and individual privacy rights. The NCB and I4C must establish ethical standards, legal oversight, and principles of proportionality for all cyber monitoring activities. Maintaining public trust is essential while addressing the risks associated with biochemical threats in digital environments to ensure that the public does not shift to alternative sources to access information and materials. This will also reduce the burden on the NCB and I4C of monitoring such online traffic.
- Enhance Upstream Controls and Regulatory Oversight: Stronger end-use verification systems, export controls, and monitoring mechanisms should be implemented for industries dealing with dual-use chemicals, particularly substances such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. These upstream controls should be integrated with dark web monitoring and financial intelligence systems. Regular audits and risk assessments of high-exposure sectors are necessary to identify vulnerabilities and mitigate their potential exploitation.
The interaction between decentralised dark web marketplaces, technological expertise, cryptocurrency-based financial systems, and domestic chemical production creates multiple pathways for biochemical risk in India. Addressing this requires a coordinated, technology-enabled, and legally robust framework. Effective implementation of the given measures would strengthen the capacity of agencies such as the I4C and NCB to counter dark-web-enabled biochemical risks while safeguarding legitimate scientific and industrial activity.
Conclusion
The dark web is an emerging dimension in the broader landscape of biochemical security, shaped by rapid technological advancements and fragmented international regulatory systems. Addressing it requires forward-looking and coordinated measures at both the national and global levels. Innovations in cyber forensics, data analytics, and blockchain technologies should be leveraged to enhance detection and enforcement capabilities. At the same time, stronger international cooperation and harmonised legal frameworks are necessary to effectively counter illicit biochemical activities on digital platforms.
However, technological solutions alone are insufficient; strengthening diplomatic engagement, regulatory responsibility, and ethical governance will ensure an appropriate balance between security and privacy. Building sustained partnerships between governments, industry, and academia will be essential in developing a comprehensive and multidimensional response to this evolving threat.
Addressing these risks requires a shift from reactive enforcement—relying on seizures of illicit material that has already crossed Indian borders and may have escaped monitoring or recalling due to supply chain leaks—to an integrated oversight encompassing chemical production, financial monitoring, and coordination among counterterrorism, cybercrime, and biosecurity agencies. In an era of rapid advancements in the life sciences, it is imperative for authorities to upgrade existing regulations to address both existing and potential risks.
Shravishtha Ajaykumar is Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology, Observer Research Foundation.
Soumya Awasthi is Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology. Observer Research Foundation.
The authors acknowledge the use of Scribbr and Elicit to generate sources for material used in this paper, and Grammarly for language refinement.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
Appendix 1
Types of Substances
| Substance Category | Common Forms/Types | Primary Sources | Dark Web Usage | Detection Challenges |
| Fentanyl and Precursor Chemicals |
· Fentanyl pills
· Powder
· NPP
· ANPP
|
· Clandestine labs
· China
· Mexico
· Dark web vendors[84]
|
· Most trafficked
· High volume in dark web markets
|
· Potency variation (0.02–5.1mg per pill)
· Contamination of other drugs
· Lethal in small doses
|
| LSD |
· Blotters
· Stamps
· Liquid
· Tabs
|
· Global supplier is Dr Seuss (Dr Seuss/Tribe Seuss)
· UK resellers (Gunga Din)[85]
|
· Specific dark web markets
· Rating-based vendor systems
|
· Odourless, colourless, tasteless
· Easy to mail
· Postal interception is the primary method of detection
|
| Ketamine |
· Powder
· Liquid
|
· Chemical suppliers
· Dark web vendors
· Clandestine synthesis[86]
|
· Mid-tier trafficking
· Pain management drug diversion
|
· Pharmaceutical-grade variant available
· Can be synthesised from precursors
|
| MDMA/Ecstasy |
· Powder
· Pills
· Crystals
| Clandestine labs (primarily European)[87] | Popular on dark web markets | Purity varies significantly—often mixed with other substances |
| Novel Opioids (Nitazenes) |
· Metonitazene
· Protonitazene
· Isotonitazene
|
· Recent synthesis
· China, UK sources[88]
|
· Emerging threat in 2024–25
· Under-detected
|
· Not yet internationally regulated
· 200x potency of morphine
· Difficult to identify in the field
|
| Precursor Chemicals |
· Dimethyl methylphosphonate (DMMP)
· TMP
· Other organic compounds
|
· Chinese manufacturers
· European chemical suppliers[89]
| Critical for clandestine drug manufacturing |
· Diverted from legitimate industrial/pharmaceutical supply chains
· Difficult to trace end use
|
| Illicit Pharmaceuticals |
· Medicines for erectile dysfunction
· Nervous system agents
· Anabolic steroids
· Anti-diabetic drugs
· Dermatological medicines
|
· Counterfeit manufacturing
· Diverted from legitimate supply[90]
| Large-scale dark web pharmaceutical markets |
· Contamination with active drugs or toxic substances
· Difficulty distinguishing genuine from counterfeit
|
| Synthetic Drugs (General) |
· Methamphetamine
· Cocaine variants
· Designer drugs
|
· Clandestine labs
· Mexican cartels
· Dark web manufacturers[91]
| Sustained high-volume trafficking |
· Composition variation
· Novel synthesis methods to evade precursor controls
|
Source: Authors’ own, using multiple open sources as cited.
Appendix 2
Digital Assets and Cryptocurrencies
| Operation (Year) | Country (ies) | Cryptocurrency Seized | Wallet Type | Conversion Value (US$/INR) | Platform Details | Investigation Method |
| Operation SpecTor (2025) | Europol—nine countries (US, Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands + four unnamed countries)[92] | Over US$53 million[93] | Multiple dark web wallets | US$53M | Dark web marketplace wallets |
Blockchain analysis
Marketplace seizure
|
| Ketamelon Operation (July 2025) | India | 70 lakh USDT (~US$84K)[94] | Hardware wallet + Binance custodial | INR 70 lakh (~US$84K) | Hardware wallet + Binance; other custodial wallets identified |
Bootable KITES OS forensics
Wallet recovery
|
| Zambada Cartel (2023) | India | Not specified cryptocurrency details | Assumed dark web wallets | INR 51.38 lakh cash (~US$62K US$)[95] | Direct seizure | Physical cash seizure at location |
| Pangea XVII (2024–25) | 90 countries (Interpol) | Component of US$65M total | US$65M in illicit pharmaceuticals value | US$65M total[96] | Online marketplace payment systems | Website shutdown (13K criminal-linked sites) |
| Ongoing Dark Web Operations | Millions in digital assets | Bitcoin, Monero, USDT, other altcoins | Millions yearly | Dark web markets (defunct: Monopoly, others) | Law enforcement blockchain-tracking tools | |
| Pattern Analysis | Increasing trend | Hardware wallets, mixing services, privacy coins | Growing sophistication | Monero adoption for anonymity; Bitcoin traceability advantage | Cooperation from international crypto exchanges |
Source: Authors’ own, using multiple open sources as cited.
Endnotes
[a] The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons and has 189 States Parties and four Signatory States.
[b] The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction has 193 States Parties.
[c] Anthrax, caused by the bacterium Bacillus anthracis, is known for its durable spores and historical use in bioterrorism, particularly during the 2001 attacks in the US.
[d] Chemical substances used in labs to form compounds.
[e] Informal value transfer systems (IVTS) refer to money transfer mechanisms operating outside formal banking channels, enabling the transfer of value through trusted intermediaries without physical or electronic movement of funds through regulated financial institutions. This can be through the hawala system.
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