What’s behind Japan’s wave of cyberattacks? | #ransomware | #cybercrime

Japan, a global leader in robotics and advanced manufacturing, is facing a cybersecurity crisis on a scale it has rarely seen in recent years. Reports of cyberattacks against Japanese organisations rose 48% in the third quarter of 2026 compared with the previous quarter, from 621 to 918 incidents, according to threat intelligence firm Recorded Future.

Tokyo-based cybersecurity company Trend Micro found that the number of incidents recorded between January and September had already exceeded the total for all of 2025, with 86 attacks in September alone.

The worst came after the summer break. In recent weeks, cyberattacks have become a near-daily occurrence for Japanese institutions and businesses.

The severity of the situation prompted Masaaki Taira, head of the National Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters (NCSH), to describe Japan’s cyberspace as being in a ‘state of emergency’. His remarks accompanied a formal alert issued by the National Cybersecurity Office (NCO) on 9 October.

The scale of the wave reflects both the number of sectors affected and the severe knock-on effects of attacks on shared technology providers. Once again, the incidents show how vulnerabilities in the supply chain can spread across organisations.

One of the most serious breaches came on 13 October, when an unidentified actor abused a software developer’s API for looking up member information. The attacker exfiltrated 22,519,960 customer records from Sourcenext, exposing passwords, physical addresses, dates of birth and employment details.

Just six days earlier, on 7 October, a ransomware attack on Japanese cloud services provider IDC Frontier caused outages and other disruptions that rippled across nearly 500 organisations and local authorities.

A similar pattern emerged after the email client Arara was compromised. The breach had an indirect impact on some 380 companies, underscoring the risks of relying on a small number of providers in the digital supply chain.

These incidents followed a bruising summer in which large-scale data breaches became routine. In July, the EPARK PeakManager booking platform had around 33 million records exposed. In September, 6.6 million accounts were compromised at the Times Car mobility service.

Critical infrastructure operators and government bodies have also been hit. An incident at railway operator JR East exposed more than 1.6 million emails. SOCRadar’s Japan Threat Landscape Report 2026 also documents the appearance on dark web forums of databases allegedly linked to the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the Japan Tourism Agency, as well as more than 20,000 Japanese driving licences. Seven terabytes of data allegedly linked to JAXA were offered for just $500.

The wave has kept JPCERT/CC, Japan’s first national computer emergency response team and a leading cybersecurity organisation in the Asia-Pacific region, busy. “We are currently dealing with these incidents, and the situation continues to evolve day by day. Unfortunately, given the circumstances, we are unable to provide a sufficiently detailed response to your questions at this time,” they said in a brief but courteous email in response to Digital Shield.

Outdated systems and open doors

How can one of the world’s leading technology powers suffer data breaches on this scale? The experts interviewed point to a deep structural divide between Japan’s largest technology companies and the bulk of its economy. According to a Money Forward study cited by Recorded Future, more than 60% of Japanese companies still rely on legacy systems, end-of-life software and outdated operating systems that no longer receive official security patches.

David Sancho, a senior threat researcher at TrendAI, challenges the idea that attackers are breaking through Japan’s most sophisticated defences. “In Japan, highly advanced organisations coexist with small businesses, local authorities and old systems that still provide essential services. Many of the targets we found were legacy web systems, exposed administration interfaces or devices that still used insecure credentials,” he explains.

Piyokango, a prominent Japanese cybersecurity incident analyst, likewise points to “basic weaknesses such as internet-facing web systems, poorly managed APIs and supply chain failures”. The concentration of services among a small number of providers magnifies the impact whenever one of them is compromised.

Mihoko Matsubara, chief cybersecurity strategist at NTT, who spent nine years as a foreign liaison officer at Japan’s Ministry of Defence, says data hygiene is also a factor. “In some recent cases, companies had failed to delete customers’ personal information once projects ended, in breach of their contractual obligations. That made the breaches much more extensive,” she tells Escudo Digital.

An army of ‘virtual interns’

The timing of these breaches has raised concerns about the offensive use of artificial intelligence. Research published by TrendAI in October examined three sets of attack infrastructure targeting Japan and confirmed varying degrees of AI-driven automation. The researchers ruled out the idea that the machines were acting of their own accord.

The most advanced case documented by the cybersecurity firm involved the misuse of CyberStrikeAI, an open-source tool based on autonomous agents. Researchers found logs showing 44 agents working in parallel and dividing up tasks such as reconnaissance, vulnerability discovery, exploitation, maintaining access and report writing. They even generated fake forms and login pages in Japanese.

Other firms, including GMO Cybersecurity and IERAE, documented the use of similar tools such as ARTEX, which was deployed against some 80 Japanese companies. JPCERT/CC detected the use of models such as Claude in recent campaigns.

“The comparison with an army of virtual interns isn’t far off, although some can already do considerably more than simple tasks,” Sancho says. “What’s new is that the scale of a campaign no longer tells us as much about how many people it takes to run it as it once did. AI lets an attacker do much more, try many more doors and do it much faster, but they still need to find one that’s open.”

Despite the sheer volume of automated scanning, Sancho says attackers managed to penetrate systems deeply in only a small fraction of cases.

The three sets of attack infrastructure analysed by TrendAI used simplified Chinese. Sancho, Piyokango and Matsubara agree that the available public evidence falls short of conclusively linking the wave to a single actor or a state-coordinated operation.

Financial gain appears to be the main motive, with attackers using ransomware for extortion and selling personal data on underground markets. Groups such as Qilin are prominent in ransomware activity in Asia. SOCRadar attributes 41.5% of the incidents to Qilin.

Matsubara warns that the breaches could have strategic consequences in the medium term. “If attackers collect and combine enough personal information, they can build detailed profiles of Japanese citizens, from their preferences to their economic activity. That data could be used in influence operations against Japan, such as targeted disinformation campaigns designed to manipulate public opinion or undermine trust in institutions.”

Japan moves to active cyber defence

Tokyo was quick to respond. On 1 October, Japan’s Act to Strengthen Cyber Response Capabilities, known as the active cyber defence law, took effect. The landmark reform requires critical infrastructure operators to report incidents and empowers the police and the Self-Defence Forces for the first time to access and disable servers used by attackers before a serious attack on national security can be carried out.

On 6 November, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s government also approved a ¥10 billion emergency package (around €60 million). It includes ¥2 billion for AI-assisted audits of government systems, as well as the creation of joint public-private cyber incident response teams.

Matsubara sees the investment as a recognition that organisations cannot shoulder responsibility for cybersecurity alone. She also points to its limits. The law applies to critical infrastructure, leaving some of the hardest-hit sectors, including retail, cosmetics and publishing, outside its direct scope. She says the budget package “must be the start of a sustained, long-term effort, not a temporary fix”.

Piyokango agrees that the law will have a limited effect on the current wave in the short term. Disabling servers “does not amount to identifying or prosecuting the attackers”, who operate from abroad using disposable infrastructure.

David Ferrete, a partner at Spanish cybersecurity and compliance firm ECIX, examines the tension between effectiveness and fundamental rights from a European regulatory perspective. “A model that encourages the public and private sectors to intervene at the same time may be more effective, but the scope for state interference is very broad and carries a greater risk of overreach,” he says.

Ferrete argues that a law permitting pre-emptive monitoring of communications “would clash directly with European rules such as the GDPR”. He also raises the question of civil liability when cyber defence teams use AI to simulate attacks on their own infrastructure. “When you exploit a vulnerability, you can break things in the process. That’s why it’s essential to establish who bears the cost of reputational damage, financial losses or a halt in production,” he says.

Ferrete also highlights how early reporting requirements run up against Japanese business culture, where admitting to a breach can carry a heavy reputational stigma. “Transparency rules clash directly with deeply rooted concerns about reputation in Japan. That increases the risk of non-compliance out of fear of the consequences and puts the onus on the government to make suffering a cyberattack something organisations can acknowledge openly,” he says.

Beyond emergency funding and the government’s new powers to disable attack infrastructure, the experts agree that the outcome will depend on more basic work: taking stock of exposed assets, closing gaps in legacy systems and recognising that AI has made it much faster for criminals to find vulnerabilities that were already there.

That will require a shift in mindset, away from the traditional reluctance to disclose incidents and towards handling them openly. As Ferrete puts it, “In cybersecurity, we always say there are only two kinds of organisations: those that have been attacked and those that will be. There is no third kind. Japan will have to take that on board.”

Japan, a global leader in robotics and advanced manufacturing, is facing a cybersecurity crisis on a scale it has rarely seen in recent years. Reports of cyberattacks against Japanese organisations rose 48% in the third quarter of 2026 compared with the previous quarter, from 621 to 918 incidents, according to threat intelligence firm Recorded Future.

Tokyo-based cybersecurity company Trend Micro found that the number of incidents recorded between January and September had already exceeded the total for all of 2025, with 86 attacks in September alone.

The worst came after the summer break. In recent weeks, cyberattacks have become a near-daily occurrence for Japanese institutions and businesses.

The severity of the situation prompted Masaaki Taira, head of the National Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters (NCSH), to describe Japan’s cyberspace as being in a ‘state of emergency’. His remarks accompanied a formal alert issued by the National Cybersecurity Office (NCO) on 9 October.

The scale of the wave reflects both the number of sectors affected and the severe knock-on effects of attacks on shared technology providers. Once again, the incidents show how vulnerabilities in the supply chain can spread across organisations.

One of the most serious breaches came on 13 October, when an unidentified actor abused a software developer’s API for looking up member information. The attacker exfiltrated 22,519,960 customer records from Sourcenext, exposing passwords, physical addresses, dates of birth and employment details.

Just six days earlier, on 7 October, a ransomware attack on Japanese cloud services provider IDC Frontier caused outages and other disruptions that rippled across nearly 500 organisations and local authorities.

A similar pattern emerged after the email client Arara was compromised. The breach had an indirect impact on some 380 companies, underscoring the risks of relying on a small number of providers in the digital supply chain.

These incidents followed a bruising summer in which large-scale data breaches became routine. In July, the EPARK PeakManager booking platform had around 33 million records exposed. In September, 6.6 million accounts were compromised at the Times Car mobility service.

Critical infrastructure operators and government bodies have also been hit. An incident at railway operator JR East exposed more than 1.6 million emails. SOCRadar’s Japan Threat Landscape Report 2026 also documents the appearance on dark web forums of databases allegedly linked to the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the Japan Tourism Agency, as well as more than 20,000 Japanese driving licences. Seven terabytes of data allegedly linked to JAXA were offered for just $500.

The wave has kept JPCERT/CC, Japan’s first national computer emergency response team and a leading cybersecurity organisation in the Asia-Pacific region, busy. “We are currently dealing with these incidents, and the situation continues to evolve day by day. Unfortunately, given the circumstances, we are unable to provide a sufficiently detailed response to your questions at this time,” they said in a brief but courteous email in response to Digital Shield.

Outdated systems and open doors

How can one of the world’s leading technology powers suffer data breaches on this scale? The experts interviewed point to a deep structural divide between Japan’s largest technology companies and the bulk of its economy. According to a Money Forward study cited by Recorded Future, more than 60% of Japanese companies still rely on legacy systems, end-of-life software and outdated operating systems that no longer receive official security patches.

David Sancho, a senior threat researcher at TrendAI, challenges the idea that attackers are breaking through Japan’s most sophisticated defences. “In Japan, highly advanced organisations coexist with small businesses, local authorities and old systems that still provide essential services. Many of the targets we found were legacy web systems, exposed administration interfaces or devices that still used insecure credentials,” he explains.

Piyokango, a prominent Japanese cybersecurity incident analyst, likewise points to “basic weaknesses such as internet-facing web systems, poorly managed APIs and supply chain failures”. The concentration of services among a small number of providers magnifies the impact whenever one of them is compromised.

Mihoko Matsubara, chief cybersecurity strategist at NTT, who spent nine years as a foreign liaison officer at Japan’s Ministry of Defence, says data hygiene is also a factor. “In some recent cases, companies had failed to delete customers’ personal information once projects ended, in breach of their contractual obligations. That made the breaches much more extensive,” she tells Escudo Digital.

An army of ‘virtual interns’

The timing of these breaches has raised concerns about the offensive use of artificial intelligence. Research published by TrendAI in October examined three sets of attack infrastructure targeting Japan and confirmed varying degrees of AI-driven automation. The researchers ruled out the idea that the machines were acting of their own accord.

The most advanced case documented by the cybersecurity firm involved the misuse of CyberStrikeAI, an open-source tool based on autonomous agents. Researchers found logs showing 44 agents working in parallel and dividing up tasks such as reconnaissance, vulnerability discovery, exploitation, maintaining access and report writing. They even generated fake forms and login pages in Japanese.

Other firms, including GMO Cybersecurity and IERAE, documented the use of similar tools such as ARTEX, which was deployed against some 80 Japanese companies. JPCERT/CC detected the use of models such as Claude in recent campaigns.

“The comparison with an army of virtual interns isn’t far off, although some can already do considerably more than simple tasks,” Sancho says. “What’s new is that the scale of a campaign no longer tells us as much about how many people it takes to run it as it once did. AI lets an attacker do much more, try many more doors and do it much faster, but they still need to find one that’s open.”

Despite the sheer volume of automated scanning, Sancho says attackers managed to penetrate systems deeply in only a small fraction of cases.

The three sets of attack infrastructure analysed by TrendAI used simplified Chinese. Sancho, Piyokango and Matsubara agree that the available public evidence falls short of conclusively linking the wave to a single actor or a state-coordinated operation.

Financial gain appears to be the main motive, with attackers using ransomware for extortion and selling personal data on underground markets. Groups such as Qilin are prominent in ransomware activity in Asia. SOCRadar attributes 41.5% of the incidents to Qilin.

Matsubara warns that the breaches could have strategic consequences in the medium term. “If attackers collect and combine enough personal information, they can build detailed profiles of Japanese citizens, from their preferences to their economic activity. That data could be used in influence operations against Japan, such as targeted disinformation campaigns designed to manipulate public opinion or undermine trust in institutions.”

Japan moves to active cyber defence

Tokyo was quick to respond. On 1 October, Japan’s Act to Strengthen Cyber Response Capabilities, known as the active cyber defence law, took effect. The landmark reform requires critical infrastructure operators to report incidents and empowers the police and the Self-Defence Forces for the first time to access and disable servers used by attackers before a serious attack on national security can be carried out.

On 6 November, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s government also approved a ¥10 billion emergency package (around €60 million). It includes ¥2 billion for AI-assisted audits of government systems, as well as the creation of joint public-private cyber incident response teams.

Matsubara sees the investment as a recognition that organisations cannot shoulder responsibility for cybersecurity alone. She also points to its limits. The law applies to critical infrastructure, leaving some of the hardest-hit sectors, including retail, cosmetics and publishing, outside its direct scope. She says the budget package “must be the start of a sustained, long-term effort, not a temporary fix”.

Piyokango agrees that the law will have a limited effect on the current wave in the short term. Disabling servers “does not amount to identifying or prosecuting the attackers”, who operate from abroad using disposable infrastructure.

David Ferrete, a partner at Spanish cybersecurity and compliance firm ECIX, examines the tension between effectiveness and fundamental rights from a European regulatory perspective. “A model that encourages the public and private sectors to intervene at the same time may be more effective, but the scope for state interference is very broad and carries a greater risk of overreach,” he says.

Ferrete argues that a law permitting pre-emptive monitoring of communications “would clash directly with European rules such as the GDPR”. He also raises the question of civil liability when cyber defence teams use AI to simulate attacks on their own infrastructure. “When you exploit a vulnerability, you can break things in the process. That’s why it’s essential to establish who bears the cost of reputational damage, financial losses or a halt in production,” he says.

Ferrete also highlights how early reporting requirements run up against Japanese business culture, where admitting to a breach can carry a heavy reputational stigma. “Transparency rules clash directly with deeply rooted concerns about reputation in Japan. That increases the risk of non-compliance out of fear of the consequences and puts the onus on the government to make suffering a cyberattack something organisations can acknowledge openly,” he says.

Beyond emergency funding and the government’s new powers to disable attack infrastructure, the experts agree that the outcome will depend on more basic work: taking stock of exposed assets, closing gaps in legacy systems and recognising that AI has made it much faster for criminals to find vulnerabilities that were already there.

That will require a shift in mindset, away from the traditional reluctance to disclose incidents and towards handling them openly. As Ferrete puts it, “In cybersecurity, we always say there are only two kinds of organisations: those that have been attacked and those that will be. There is no third kind. Japan will have to take that on board.”


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